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CHAPTER I: THE TENSION BETWEEN THE EFFORT TO DISCOVER THE
TRUTH AND INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY
"Democracy means that if the doorbell rings in the
early hours, it is likely to be the milkman." 1
The different cultural and comparative approaches of
two important legal systems have repercussions on criminal
justice. Under the American approach, freedom of the
individual is a paramount ideal. Distrust of any kind of
abuse of power is one of the main feature of the American
legal system. The French take a contrary approach. Freedom
is achieved through the State under French law. As a result
of these differences, in the first stage of the criminal
process, e.g., the relation between police and suspects,
there seems to be better protection of the individuals'
rights in the United States than in France.
This paper will examine the protection of individuals'
rights, including the rights of privacy 2 and of locomotion
during the investigatory stage in American and French
criminal procedure. It will do so by focusing on searches
and seizures. However, this not a reform oriented work. Even
1 Yackle, the Reagan Administration's Habeas Corpus Proposals
,
68 Iowa L. Rev. 609 (1983) (Quoting Winston Churchill).
2 By right of privacy, I mean the right to be protected in one's
property and one's person against arbitrary intrusions.
2though the two systems are different, this paper will not
attempt to say that one system is superior. Rather, a major
target will be the tracing of the police investigatory
powers through searches and seizures, and how that impacts
on individuals' rights. A conclusion will be offered that
the investigatory function threatens these rights both in
the United States and in France.
I. A closer analysis of the American criminal procedure
through a comparative study
A. American suspects more protected?
The American law treats a suspect as a criminal
defendant when the state has initiated adversary judicial
proceedings against him, whereas the French criminal
procedure requires a certain quantum of proof to consider
the suspect as a defendant. Most of the scholars 3 analyzing
the French criminal system consider that the citizens'
rights during the police investigation stage are better
protected in the United States than in France. According to
their view, the French police seem to have greater powers to
3 Edward A. Tomlinson, Justice issues in the United States, West
Germany, England, and France: Non adversarial Justice : The French
Experience, 42 Md L. Rev. 131 (1983) [hereinafter Tomlinson, The
French Experience]; Jack Norton, Truth and Individual Rights: A
Comparison of United States and French Pre-trial Procedure, 2 Am.
Crim. L.Q. 159 (1964); Cynthia Vroom, La liberte individuelle au stade
de 1 ' enguete de police en France et aux Etats Unis, Revue de Sciences
Criminelles et de Droit Compare [Rev. sc . crim. ] 487-507 (1988).
3search and to seize evidence of criminal activity or persons
than American law enforcers. As a matter of fact, the French
criminal procedure ignores different American concepts
protecting individuals' rights such as probable cause or the
exclusionary rule. In meanwhile, American practice of law
enforcement shows that police can exercise most of the
French police powers because the safeguards against police
intrusions have been redefined more narrowly under the
actual U.S. Supreme Court. The result is that in both
countries, police have broad investigatory powers. 4
It is also admitted that American criminal procedure
focuses on the protection of the innocent individual
,
whereas the inquiry regularity is the main preoccupation
under the French Law. 5 However, Article Sixty-six of the
actual French Constitution of 4 October, 1958, makes the
Judiciary, e.g., civil and criminal courts, guardian of
individual liberty. 6 Therefore, either an interference into
individual liberty is authorized by the Judicial Authority
or the latter controls the regularity of such a decision.
In other words, an intervention of the Judiciary remains
necessary when a proceeding or a statute encroaches on
4 Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice, 7 8 Cal . L.
Rev. 539 (1990) .
5 See Tomlinson, The French Experience, supra note 3.
6 See Fr. Const, art. 66:
No one may be arbitrarily detained.
The Judicial Authority, guardian of individual liberty, shall
enforce this principle under the conditions stipulated by
legislation.
4individual liberty. We shall see that a special Court called
the Constitutional Council, may invalidate a law encroaching
on individuals' rights. The principle of separation of
powers, heritage of Montesquieu, does not permit the
ordinary courts to pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute. 7 On the contrary, this judicial review has been
admitted in the United States since 1803 in the landmark
case Marbury v. Madison. 8 The French Constitutional Council
can check the conformity of a bill with constitutional
materials called the "bloc of constitutionality.
"
9 This
movement of "constitutionalization" of criminal law offers
new guarantees against government intrusions. 10 Moreover,
there are international protections, particularly European
safeguards, against states' misconduct that are enforced
before European courts.
7 It must be emphasized that the French administrative courts (a
specific system of courts dominated at the top by the Council of
State) can check the Executive activities by annulling or reforming a
decision in contrast with the other courts. The latter are not allowed
to control Executive activity under the principle of the separation
between judicial and administrative authorities.
8 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9 Those constitutional materials encompass the Constitution
itself and its Preamble, the Fundamental Principles recognized by the
Laws of the Republic, the principles most vital in our time, e.g.,
right to strike, and the principles of constitutional values.
10 V. L. Favoreu, La constitutionnalisation du droit penal et de
la procedure penal e . Vers un droit cons t
i
tutionnel penal, in Melanges
Vitu, Cujas (1989)
.
B. Two "opposite" criminal justice systems
It is traditional to oppose the French inquisitorial
procedure to the accusatorial or adversary American one. The
French criminal system must not be confused with the
barbarian proceedings of the Inquisition period. In the
United States as well as in France, each criminal system
encompasses a mixture of both proceedings. As concerning to
the gathering of evidence, the American judge does not
participate in the discovery of the truth. On the contrary,
the French investigating judge {juge d ' instruction who is
appointed by a decret of the President of the Republic)
operating in the framework of an instruction can conduct the
investigation himself. 11 He also performs the functions of a
judge by issuing orders which can be appealed before the
indictment division ( chambre d' accusation) . The juge
d' instruction is independent from the prosecution, the
indictment division and the parties. 12
1. Decentralization of the American police
In the United States, a wide variety of officials
perform the police function such as governmental officers,
11 Another difference between both systems concerns the criminal
trial itself. In France, the presiding trial judge takes a more active
role than his American counterpart.
12 See Christian Dadomo & Susan Farran, The French Legal System
(1993) .
6authorities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, state
policemen, and county and city police officers. Those forces
are created by various levels of government and the staff is
locally recruited. There are no general principles for
organizing policing structures. The police and prosecutorial
functions are separated. Thus, police are independent of the
local prosecutor and responsible before the local executive
branch. The supervision of police is exercised principally
by elected persons. 13
Two views of criminal procedure have been described,
the Crime Control Model and the Due Process Model. 14 The
former relies on the repression of criminal conduct. It is
grounded on efficiency, administrative and expeditious
procedures. Under this approach, police misconduct is
deterred through discipline sanctions and civil tort
remedies. On the contrary, the Due Process Model is more
concerned with equality and fairness in criminal procedure.
It appears to be an adversary and judicial model. Thus,
evidence illegally searched and seized will be excluded and
the prosecution dismisses. Many commentators have referred
to these models. However, it has been argued that these two
approaches were too general and too simplified. 15
13 See Eric H. Monkkonen, Crime and Justice in American History,
Policing and Crime control § 5 (1992).
14 See Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process,
118 U.Pa. L. Rev. 1-68 (1964).
15 See Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two
Models of Criminal Procedure, 121 U.Pa. L. Rev. 506 (1973) (especially
pp. 575-76)
.
7Nevertheless, they permit one to better understand the
actual trend of the actual U.S. Supreme Court aimed at
enforcing law.
2. Integration of the French police with the prosecution
function
The National Police depend on the Minister of the
Interior whereas the Gendarmes are under the authority of
the Minister of the Defense. The police attached to a
certain tribunal are under the public prosecutor's
supervision, his control and his evaluation. 16 The Criminal
Procedure Code compels the police to inform the prosecutor
"without delay" when the commission of an offense is known
by them and "immediately" for a flagrant offense. 17
Judicial police and administrative police must be
distinguished under French law. The former investigate
offenses and apprehend criminals within a repressive
mission. The latter protect public, security, health and
tranquillity under a preventive mission. This separation of
functions is fundamental because the rules applicable
change. The administrative law controls the administrative
police's missions, whereas the repressive mission relies on
16 Code de procedure penal [C. Pr . Pen.] art. 41 al 2 (Fr.).
17 C. Pr. Pen. arts. 19, 54 (Fr.). The notion of flagrancy will
be studied in chapter II. It is a crime or a misdemeanor which is in
the process of being committed, or which has just been committed
according to art. 53 of C. Pr . Pen. (Fr.).
8criminal law principles such as the principle of legality. 18
The criterion to draw the distinction relies on the purpose
of the police's action, e.g., either to prevent offenses or
to apprehend offenders. It must be stressed that the same
personnel may act under both missions. The broad
investigatory powers provided by the Criminal Procedure
Code, such as investigatory detentions, are reserved to the
judicial police's missions. The police used pretextual stop
to control identity of demonstrators and detained them to
verify their identity. 19 Their purpose was to prevent public
disorder before demonstrations. Neither offense had been
committed and nor of the individuals was suspected. Such a
detention was similar to an administrative decision of
confinement without any legal grounds. The Cour de
cassation20 censured the lower court reasoning. 21 However, it
held that the police officers had faced a flagrancy
18 Moreover, the judicial courts are competent to any issue
arising in a repressive mission. On the contrary, a claim of damages
for example occurring in an operation of administrative police will be
brought before the administrative courts.
19 Judgment of Jan. 5, 1973 (Friedel case), Cass. crim. , 1973
Bulletin Criminel [Bull. Crim.], No . 7 ; 1973 Recueil Dalloz,
Jurisprudence [D. Jur
.
] 541 note Roujou de Boubee (Fr. ) . The French
identification proceedings as well as the longer detention up to 24
hours will be examined in chapter III. The police officers are allowed
to detain a person up to four hours if she cannot identify herself or
refuse to do so. They can also detain a suspect of a criminal offense
up to 24 hours.
20 The Cour de cassation is the highest court for civil and
criminal law matters. It encompasses five civil division and one
criminal division.
21 The lower court justified its refusal to prosecute the
government for arbitrary detention by relying on the administrative
police power to temporally detain someone in accordance with common
practice
.
9situation because of the suspicious identity card. This
latter could lead the authorities to presume the commission
of offenses and therefore, to authorize a detention up to
twenty-four hours. The suspicious identity card transformed
an administrative mission at its inception to a judicial
one. Therefore, it has been argued that suspicious behaviors
can provide a sufficient basis for flagrancy inquiries. 22
There is also a relevant hierarchy among the police
officers. Officers of the judicial police are distinguished
from agents of the judicial police. The broader
investigative powers are reserved to the former. This
principle has been reaffirmed by the Cour de cassation by
reversing a confiscation of radar detector seized by agents,
not officers, of the judicial police. 23 In meanwhile, the
agents may exercise the same large investigatory powers
under the officers' supervision. Nonetheless, operations
that are not directly supervised are routinely approved by
officers of judicial police.
The judicial police activities are exercised in three
different settings, the flagrancy inquiry, the preliminary
inquiry and the inquiry under rogatories commissions. The
first one occurs when offenses are in progress or have just
been committed. Similarly, when the offense is committed
22 See Judgment of Nov. 8, 1979, Cass. crim. , 1980 Juris-
Classeur Periodigue, Jurisprudence [J.C.P. II] 19337 note Jean Davia
(Fr.) .
23 Judgment of Jun. 17, 1987, Cass, crim., 1987 Bull. Crim., No
253. (Fr. )
.
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very near in time to the apprehension of a suspect pursued
by public clamor or found in possession of evidence of the
criminal activity, there is flagrancy. 24 It is a coercive
inquiry reserved only to crimes and delits punished at least
by two months of imprisonment. 25 The preliminary inquiry is
opened on police officers initiative or on instruction from
the prosecutor for any offense (crime, delit and
contravention) . It is the most widespread and usually
opposed to the first one because of its non coercive
feature, even though the individuals may be summoned or
detained under their consent. 26 Therefore, most of the
investigation acts, searches and seizures, can be executed
by agents of the judicial police except the detention up to
twenty-four hours. Finally, the formal judicial
investigatory can be directed by the examining judge (juge
d' instruction) himself when he has opened an instruction
either under the request of the prosecutor {requisitoire
introductif) or under the victim's complaint (plainte avec
constitution de partie civile) . The scope of his
investigation depends on the matters set out in the
requisitoire introductif but it may be extended by the
examining judge. However, he will generally delegate this
24 See C. Pr . Pen. art. 53 which defines the flagrancy offenses.
Similarly, offenses taking place in a house where the chief requires
the authorities to record them are assimilated to flagrancy by the
Code.
25 The French Criminal Code classifies the offenses in three
categories: contraventions ('minor or petty offenses) divided into five
classes, delits (major offenses) and crimes (serious crimes)
.
26 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 75 (Fr.).
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task to the judicial police officers through rogatories
commission (commissions rogatoires) because of lack of time
and material means. From now on, the police are under the
examining magistrate's control once an instruction is
opened. Where there are weighty and collaborative evidence
(indices graves et concordants) , the suspect is scrutinized
(mise en examen) . Then, he may fully use his defense rights
such as legal assistance.
In both justice systems, French and American, the
investigatory function impacts heavily on individual rights
and liberties.
II. A difficult balance between discovery of the truth and
individuals' rights
A. The American Constitutional guarantees
1. Protection against arbitrary intrusions
The U.S. Constitution is the main source of protection.
Most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights that
encompasses the first ten Amendments, are procedural and
impose safeguards on personal dignity and privacy. The
applicability of the Federal Bill of Rights, (approved by
Congress in 1789 and ratified by the states in 1791) into
the states via the Fourteenth Amendment (ratified in July
12
21, 1868) was one of the main constitutional issues in the
beginning of this century. The text was intended first to
apply only to federal criminal defendants. The first step
was to incorporate selectively certain provisions of the
Bill of rights into the states through the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Then, fundamental
fairness was admitted as a general principle in a proceeding
against an individual. Thus, even though none specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights are violated, the Due
Process of Law is violated when the state does not act with
fairness against an individual. 27 The Due Process clause is
grounded on the Fifth Amendment pertaining the federal
government and upon the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution protecting persons from state actions. The
procedural feature of the clause guarantees fair procedures.
The substantive aspect protects a person's property from
unfair governmental interferences or taking.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution deals
with searches and seizures and provides:
27 The notion of Due Process of Law was explained in Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97 (1908); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58
S.Ct. 149, 832 L.Ed. 288 (1937). See Black's Law Dictionary 500 (6th
ed. 1991). In the Powell case, the Court emphasized the necessity to
inquire "whether the defendants were in substance denied the right of
counsel, and if so, whether such denial infringes the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." See 287 U.S. 45, 51. The freedom
of speech and of the press are also protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S.
312, 316, (1926), the Court stated that the due process of law
encompasses the "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."
13
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
This right is recognized by the states and federal
constitutions. The interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
has raised difficulties because of the absence of an
explicit warrant requirement for searches and seizures. 28
For some scholars, the core of this constitutional provision
relies on the reasonableness standard. Therefore, the
warrant as well as the probable cause requirements are
mislead. 29 The intent of the framers has been construed to
prohibit only unreasonable searches and seizures. 30
Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court's majority view has
stated that searches and seizures require a presumptive
warrant as well as a probable cause for warrantless
intrusion to be reasonable. 31
It might be argued that these constitutional guarantees
restrict the gathering of evidence against individuals.
28 William D. Anderson, Jr., Overview of the Fourth Amendment,
82 Geo. L.J. 597 (1994). The author claims that " [I] nterpreted
literally, the Amendment does not require warrants for searches and
seizures, nor does it require that searches and seizures be supported
by probable cause."
29 Akil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv.
L. Rev. 757 (1994) .
30 See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947) ("[I]t
is only unreasonable searches and seizures which come within the
constitutional interdiction.").
31 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925).
14
However, a democratic and free society needs some barriers
to government's action.
2. State interest in effective law enforcement
Every criminal system is faced with the need of an
efficient justice to fight crime without being arbitrary. It
has been stressed that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid
any search and seizure but only unreasonable intrusions in
one's privacy. Thus, the Fourth Amendment does not "den[y]
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence ... [but it] requir[es] that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate.
"
32
The Constitutional provision protects individuals only
against government action. Private searches such as those
conducted by private company guards or neighborhood security
patrols are outside the field of the constitutional
guarantees. Nevertheless, searches by private persons but
considered as public function, e.g., exclusively reserved to
the government, must meet the Fourth Amendment
requirements. 33 Similarly, a sufficient connection between
the private action and the government makes the search
"public." Thus, if a statute makes intrusions in one's
32 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
33 See Flagg Bros v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
15
privacy compulsory or encourages them strongly, we face a
government action. 34 However, these exceptions are construed
narrowly. Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment provisions apply
only to the "national community" and not to the nonresident
aliens
.
35
B. The French Legislative protections
According to the 1789 Declaration of Human Rights, 36
the State guarantees and protects an individual '
s
fundamental rights. Therefore, one of the police functions,
as representatives of the State, is to enforce this
protection. A conflict may arise between the means used by
law enforcers and their guardian's role of individual
rights
.
37
34 See Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963)
(segregation of a private restaurant is government action because it
is compelled by state law); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n,
489 U.S. 602, 615 (1989)
.
35 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez , 494 U.S. 259, 110 S.Ct.
1056, 108 L.Ed. 2d 222 (1990).
36 The French Constitution incorporates by reference the
individual rights recognized in the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution
and in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. See
Fr. Const. (Constitution Act, 1958).
37 Etienne Pi card, La police et le secret des donnees d'ordre
personnel en droit francais, Rev. sc . crim. 275 (1993) (Arts. 2, 12 of
the declaration of 1789) (Fr.).
16
1. Principle of legality
The state must proceed according to the provisions of
the Criminal Procedure Code recently reformed by the Act of
August 24, 1993. 38 This general principle of law stated in
the Declaration of Human Rights of 1789 39 was a reaction
against the arbitrary criminal proceedings during Ancien
Regime (from the XII century till 1789) . With the
revolutionaries, the loi becomes the only source of criminal
law as well as criminal procedure. It means that the citizen
cannot be punished for a criminal offense that is not
codified by a law ruled by Legislature. This fundamental
principle has been re-shaped in the actual Constitution of
1958. Thus, the text distinguishes the areas falling in the
legislative field and those belonging to the Executive under
its articles Thirty-four and Thirty-seven. The legislative
power determines the crimes and misdemeanors (crimes et
delits) , as well as the penalties imposed. 40 The
38 Act of Aug. 24, 1993 modifying the Act of Jan. 4, 1993
reforming the criminal procedure
,
No. 93-1013, Journal Officiel
[J.O.] Aug. 25, 1993; Bernard Bouloc, Chronique legislative, Rev. sc
.
crim. 590 (1994) (Fr. )
.
39 See arts. 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10 and particularly art. 8 providing
that "[T]he law may only establish those penalties that are strictly
and clearly necessary and no one may be punished except under a law
established and promulgated prior to the wrongful act (delits)." The
phase " crimes et delits" was construed before 1958 as encompassing all
the offenses.
40 Fr. Const, art. 34:
- All laws shall be passed by Parliament.
Laws shall establish the regulations concerning: [part
omitted]
17
construction of Article Thirty-four raised difficulties
because the contraventions , the third type of offense, does
not appear in its content. Therefore, the executive branch
may be competent to create and to punish the petty offenses
by imprisonment. Such a power is in contradiction with the
principle of legality found in the former Article Four of
the Penal Code stating that none offense committed prior the
loi providing penalties, could be punished. 41 This issue
divided the Constitutional Council, the Council of State and
the Cour de cassation.* 2 Today, the debate seems over
because the new Penal Code prohibits imprisonment penalties
for the contraventions. 43 In other words, the Executive
remains competent to determine and sanction the petty
offenses except for the imprisonment penalties. 44
- determination of crimes and misdemeanors (crimes et delits)
,
as well as the penalties imposed therefor; criminal procedure;
amnesty; the creation of new juridical systems and the status
of magistrates, [part omitted]
.
41 The Penal Code has also been reformed by the Act of December
16, 1992 modified by the Act of July 19, 1993. The new Code is
applicable since March 1, 1994.
42 The Council of State refused to encompass the petty offenses
in the legislative field. See Judgment of Feb. 12, 1960 (Societe Eky)
,
Conseil d'Etat, 1960 J.C.P. II 11169 bis note Vedel (Fr.). The
Constitutional Council held that the executive branch cannot impose
imprisonment as a contravention penalty. See Decision of Nov. 28,
1973, Conseil Constitutionnel [Con. const.] (Fr.). The Cour de
cassation adopted the same holding as the highest administrative court
in the Schiavon case. See Judgment of Feb. 26, 1974. Cass. crim. , 1974
Gazette du Palais [G.P.] 1, 235 (Fr.). It accepted the competence of
the Executive to rule imprisonment penalties for the petty offenses.
43 See C. Pen. art. 131-12 (Fr.) stating the penalties available
for the contraventions: fine and deprivation of certain rights such as
the suspension of one's driver's license or the seizure of the
instrument of the offense.
44 Moreover, the French Constitution in its article 11, 16, 38,
92 allows the Legislature to delegate its powers to the Executive in
Surprisingly, body searches as well as vehicles
searches are not regulated under the Criminal Procedure
Code. The rules applicable to the former are found in an
executive act organizing the services of gendarmerie.* 5
However, body searches, in contrast to vehicles searches,
have been assimilated by the French courts to the
perquisitions* 6 which are regulated in the Criminal
Procedure Code. 47 Fairness in the gathering of proof
prevents the acquisition of evidence in violation of the
sanctity of the domicile protected in Article 226-4 of the
new Penal Code. However, this article also foresees the
intrusion in one's domicile that would be authorized by the
law.
The fair treatment general principle of law exists when
the "rights of defense" emanating from the Code's frame have
not yet attached, e.g., during a police inquiry.
Nonetheless, one of the aim of the recent criminal procedure
reform was to improve the suspect's protection during this
critical stage. 48 The "rights of defense" have not been
certain circumstances. Through these delegations, the criminal
procedure has been reformed.
45 Act of May 20, 1903 modified by an act of August 22, 1958.
The provision of this statute allows gendarmes to conduct body search
of any individual apprehending in a flagrancy situation (art. 307).
Similarly, prior to the detention of a person within the garde a vue
body searches are lawful . Finally a drunk person found in a public
place can be frisked before being retained (art. 308).
46 It is a search of incriminating evidence conducted in an
enclosed place such as one's domicile.
47 See Judgment of Jan. 22, 1953, Cass. crim. , 1953 D. Jur
.
533; 1953 J.C.P. II 7456 (Fr.)..
48 From now on, an individual detained during an investigation,
within the frame of the garde a vue (police custody) , has a right to
19
defined precisely concerning their source and scope. 49 They
imply a contradictory examination, not only of the files
gathered in the dossier during an instruction, but also of
the debates under the jurisprudence of the Cour de
cassation. Moreover, those rights permit some form of
judicial review of an administrative decision taking the
form of a sanction against an individual. 50 The secret of
conversations between a counsel and his client falls into
the "rights of defense." They are not invoked in the
Constitution itself. Nevertheless, they have been elevated
as constitutional rights by the Constitutional Council. 51
2. Facultative preliminary check: The constitutional control
Since 1958, the Constitutional Council may confront
bills with the Constitution to validate or invalidate them
counsel arising after a certain period of detention. We will examine
closely this important police seizure power in chapter III.
49 In the Tery case, the Council of State held that the "rights
of Defense" encompass the right to timely notice, the right to demand
that all members of the tribunal be present at all times and their
names be affixed to the judgment, the right to be heard after the
presentation of the charges and before the deliberation of the
tribunal and finally, the right to require that every judgment
contains grounds. See Judgment of June 20, 1913 (Tery case), Conseil
d'Etat, in Long Weil, & Braibant, Les Grands Arrets de la
Jurisprudence Administrative (Fr.).
50 Judgment of Feb. 7, 1947, (d'Ailleres case) Conseil d'Etat,
1947 Dalloz Periodique, Doctrine [D.P. Doc] 62 (Fr.).
51 Decision of Dec. 2, 1976, Con. const., Fr
.
, Dec. 7, 1976 J.O.
7052; Decision of Jan. 19-20, 1981, (decision "Security and Liberty.")
Con. const., Fr
.
, Jan. 22, 1981 J.O. 308 (Fr.). In the latter
decision, the provision of the law allowing the presiding judge to
prevent a lawyer guilty of causing a disturbance access to the court
room violated the constitutional principle of the rights of the
defense. Jan. 22, 1981 J.O. at 311.
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between the times of their enactment and promulgation.
However, it is not a mandatory control. Different political
officials, the President of the Republic, the Prime
Minister, each President of the Houses (Chamber of Deputies
and Senate) , or sixty deputies or senators since 1974, can
refer to the Constitutional Council bills for review. 52 On
the contrary, the citizens do not have access to
constitutional justice. The Constitution's revision of
November 1993 did not expand the right to challenge a bill
for review. The Constitutional Council will check the
conformity of the bill with the materials encompassed in the
"bloc of constitutionality." 53
In its historical decision of July 16, 1971, 54 the
French Constitutional Council, relying on the Preamble of
the Constitution, elevated freedom to the status of a
constitutional right. For the first time, a statute
encroaching on individual freedom (freedom of association)
was nullified. The Constitutional Council held that the
judiciary authority must guarantee the enforcement of the
52 The members' term lasts nine years, and one-third of the
members is replaced every three years. The members are appointed in
rotation by the President of the Republic, by the Chairman of the
National Assembly, and by the President of the Senate.
53 See supra note 9
.
54 Decision of July 16, 1971, Con. const. 1971 Juris-Classeur
Periodique, Doctrine [J.C.P. I.] 16832; 1971 Actualite Juridique de
Droit Administratif [A.J.D.A.] 537 note Rivero (Fr.). The bill
provided that the legal capacity of a registered association would
depend on a preliminary check made by the Judicial authority. Before
this bill, an association could be created freely. Therefore, the
constitutional court seized by the President of Senate struck down the
bill because it violated a constitutional liberty.
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constitutional rules. This judicial review on civil
liberties grounds has often been compared to the leading
case Marbury v. Madison. 55 Since 1971, the Council's
function is no more limited to that "of preserving the
constitutional balance struck in 1958 by assuring that
Parliament respects the limits imposed on its legislative
competence vis-a-vis the Government." 56 This landmark
decision gave constitutional value to the texts incorporated
in the Preamble of the Constitution 57 that proclaim
individual liberty, composed of personal security and
privacy, as the inalienable right of man. From now on, the
need to protect the liberty against the law is enforced by
the Constitutional Council. 58 The effectiveness of such a
control has been recently reaffirmed. The Constitutional
Council struck down a bill --related to the need to prevent
violence during demonstrations-- giving the high ranking
civil servants (les prefets) the power to order vehicles'
searches to seize any object that might be used as weapons
during demonstrations. The Constitutional Council, relying
55 See supra note 8. However, it has been stressed that
constitutional control existed prior to the 1971 decision. See
Cynthia Vroom, Constitutional Protection of Individual Liberties in
France: The Conseil cons t
i
tutionnel since 1971, 63 Tul . L. Rev. 2 65,
274 (1988) [hereinafter Vroom, The Conseil Constitutionnel] .
.
56 Beardsley, The Constitutional Council and Constitutional
Liberties in France, 20 Am. J. Comp. L 431, 436-37 (1972) (the author
refers to the separation of competencies between the Executive and the
Legislature as provided by articles 34 and 37 of the Constitution)
;
Haimbaugh, Was it France' s Marbury v. Madison? , 35 Ohio St. L.J. 910
(1974) .
57 See supra note 36.
58 See J. Rivero, Le Conseil Constitutionnel, et Les Libertes,
131 (1984) (Fr. )
.
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on Article Sixty-six of the Constitution, held that the
Judicial Authority must authorize such an intrusion because
of its guardian role. 59
3. Higher supervision of individual's privacy
a. The European Convention
The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of November 4, 1950, was
ratified by the French government in 1974 and in 1981 for
its Article Twenty-five providing a judicial remedy for
individuals before the European institutions. 60 Article
Eight deals with individual privacy and states that
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his
correspondence
.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except
such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
59 See Decision of January 18, 1995, Con. const., Fr. , 1995
Dalloz, Legislation [D.L.] 92 (Fr.).
60 [European] Convention for the protection of Human rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U. N. T. S. 222, entered into
force Sept. 3, 1953; amended by Protocol No. 3, entered into force
Sept. 21, 1970, and Protocol No. 5, entered into force Dec. 21, 1971.
The French Act No. 73-1227 of Dec. 31, 1973 allowed the ratification.
See Jan. 3, 1974 J.O. 67.
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Article Five of the Convention interests us as well because
it protects individual liberty and security of persons
against arbitrary seizures and detentions. 61 The European
Court of Human Rights as well as the European Commission
interpret broadly the provisions of the Convention,
particularly its Article Eight. The jurisprudence of the
European Courts has argued the necessity of a flexible
construction of the Convention. The agreement is part of
French law and therefore, directly applicable before French
courts. 62 Furthermore, the individuals may bring a petition
before the European institutions.
b. The effectiveness of the Convention
Individuals can bring a petition before the Commission
of Human rights which is composed of twenty-eight members
sitting in sessions in Strasbourg (art. 25). 63 The remedy is
available if the applicants establish to be victims of a
breach of the Convention as well as an exhaustion of the
61 id.
62 See Fr . Const, art. 55 making ratified treaties overriding
Acts of Parliament.
63 See Tom Wart, The Admissibility of Human Rights Petitions
.
The Case Law of the European Commission of Human Rights and the Human
Rights Committee, § 2.2 (1994). The members of the Commission are
elected by the Committee of Ministers for a period of six years. Eight
sessions a year are usually held. Id. at § 2.2.1. The contracting
states can also denunciate to the Commission the violations of the
Convention by another contracting State or bring an action directly
before the European Court of Human Rights. Nevertheless, they rarely
do so
.
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domestic remedies. 64 First, the Commission examines the
admissibility of the petition under a contradictory
examination. A lawyer of the Secretariat of the Commission
prepares the decision on this issue in consultation with the
Rapporteur, member of the Commission to whom the case has
been referred. Once the application is held admissible by
the Commission's majority vote, the Commission tries to
settle an agreement out of the Court. If it fails, a report
discloses the facts and the opinion as regard to the
Convention's violation by the State party. This report is
sent to the Committee of Ministers and to the State party.
The Commission's report does not bind the Court of Human
Rights. Then, the Plenary Commission decides to bring the
case before submitting it to the Court in a period of three
months from the date of the report's transmission to the
Committee of Ministers. Full jurisdiction is given to the
Court that may redecide the admissibility of the petition.
The Court affords just satisfaction to the injured party
(art. 50) . A recent agreement provides the replacement of
the above procedure by the establishment of a permanent and
full time European Court of Human rights. 65
64 In practice, the applicants will produce evidence of an
exhaustion of local remedies when the State party raises the objection
of non-exhaustion. Once the State party has shown existence of
effective and sufficient domestic remedies, the applicants may contest
the state's claim with contrary evidence.
65 See Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Explanatory Report, Treaties
and Reports, Council of Europe, 1994. Some preparatory documents have
been published in 14 HRLJ (1993), pp. 31-49.
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A state intrusion in one's privacy may be allowed under
certain conditions. Thus, the state interference must be
grounded on a clear and complete law providing proportionate
measures. Recently, the French provisions of the Customs
Code dealing with searches and seizures have been deemed
illegal. 66 The European Court of Human Rights held that the
French customs searches and seizures proceedings did not
offer sufficient guarantees against administrative
authorities' intrusions. The vagueness of the rules as well
as their gaps violated the principle of proportionality
between the remedies used to enforce law and the
interferences in one's privacy.
4. Relativity of Individuals Rights
In its decision "Security and Liberty,
"
67 the
Constitutional Council tried to reconcile individuals'
liberties and the necessities of justice (apprehending the
offenders) as well as the protection of the public order.
The bill controlled by the "Court" and partly validated,
legalized the identity checks and authorized a twenty-four
66 Affaires Cremieux v. France, Aff. Funke v. France; Aff.
Miaailhe v. France, Eur. Ct . H.R. (ser. A) at 256 (1993).
67 See Decision of Jan. 19-20, 1981, (decision "Security and
Liberty") Con. const., Fr
.
, Jan 22, 1981 J.O. 308 (Fr.).
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extension of garde a vue in certain cases upon the judge's
approval
.
68
Before to this statute, police custody was limited to
twenty-four hours, with a twenty-four extension under the
prosecutor's authorization. Therefore, a third period of
detention was added by the challenge provision for certain
offenses. The "Court" held that constitutional principles
such as the protection of the public order encompassing the
apprehension of offenders, persons and goods security, may
authorize state intrusions in one's privacy under the
condition of an intervention of the Judicial Authority,
guardian of individual liberty. According to the
Constitutional Council, the requirements of Article Sixty-
six were met.
This constitutional decision shows the relativity of
the role of Judicial Authority as a guardian of individual
liberty. The judges are obliged to apply the law. Therefore,
a law giving broad investigating police powers must be
enforced. The absence of mandatory control by the
Constitutional Council and the prohibition of such a check
by the French courts permits encroachments on individual
68 See Vroom, The Conseil Constitutionnel , supra note 55 at 281.
(1988). The law dealt with different criminal aspects such as
toughening criminal sanction, accelerating criminal procedure,
facilitating the entry of victims into criminal cases, reducing delays
in various criminal proceedings, giving judges certain powers
belonging to prosecutors and increasing the right to court hearing of
those in detention.
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rights. Furthermore, a state interest such as public order
may outweigh privacy and security rights.
CHAPTER II: GATHERING OF EVIDENCE BY SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
I. Judicial control of the police investigation powers
A. The warrant requirement
Before examining the legality of a warrantless search
or seizure, a search or a seizure must have occurred under
the meaning given to those terms by the American courts. 69
Thus, a governmental invasion of one's reasonable
expectation of privacy is a search. 70 The objective
expectation of privacy is that recognized by the society.
Leaving objects in plain view to be seized does not fit the
reasonableness test. 71 The degree of intrusiveness may also
determine whether a search has taken place. A sniff test by
a dog does not fall within the Fourth Amendment
requirements. 72 Similarly, the reasonable test is used to
confirm the seizure of a person. The seizure of a thing
69 Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32
Santa Clara L. Rev. 737, 742-48 (1992).
70 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) . However,
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy when a conversation is
wiretapped with the consent of one of the participant (the undercover
agent). See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
71 However, the officers must be lawfully present and have
probable cause to believe the items are incriminating.
72 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
28
29
occurs when there is a "meaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interest in that property." 73
1. A principle in the United States
The text of the Fourth Amendment does not itself
require either warrant or probable cause to search and seize
evidence. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held its
preference for a warrant requirement. 74 A warrant must be
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate upon probable
cause. Thus, an attorney general does not have the character
of a neutral and detached magistrate. 75
There is an immense body of law concerning probable
cause, defined as sufficient information to support a
reasonable belief that evidence of an offense is present in
a particular place or that a person committed an offense.
The intrusion in one's privacy must be justified at its
inception as well as its scope. 76 The particularity
requirement implies a precise suspicion for searching a
particular spot or seizing a specific person. General
searches and seizures are prohibited. The search of a stolen
car in an upstairs bedroom exceeds the scope of the
73 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)
74 See supra note 31.
75 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
76 See Galloway, supra note 69, at 768-70.
30
interference. 77 Scholars point out that the use of
expressions such as "fair probability" or "substantial
chance" 78 that seizable items will be found or that a person
has committed an offense suggests that a lesser quantum of
information is needed. 79
Probable cause is found under the totality of the
circumstances. 80 The veracity, the reliability of the
source, the means used to get the information and any
corroboration permit to meet the probable cause requirement.
However, it has been argued that magistrates approve
automatically the police officer's request presenting
probable cause without making an independent examination. 81
The probable cause standards appear flexible. An anonymous
informant's tip, 82 hearsay from a reliable source 83 or the
officers' experience may support probable cause. 84
77 Id. at 770 citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824
(1982) ("Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may
be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs
bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being
transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a
suitcase . " )
.
78 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 244 n. 13 (1983).
79 Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Eclipse of the Fourth Amendment:
Searches and Seizures in the Burger Court, CACJ Forum plO-15 (Jan.-
Feb. 1990) [hereinafter Galloway, Eclipse]
.
80 See supra note 78 at 230, 233, 234, 238, 241.
81 See William J. Stunz, Warrant and Fourth Amendment Remedies,
11 VA.L.REV. 881, 881-83 (1991).
82 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (The "two-pronged"
test previously adopted in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, is replaced
by a more flexible approach under the totality of the circumstances.
The former test required evidence of informant's credibility and
surrounding circumstances showing the basis of the informant's
conclusions. In Gates, the Court relied upon corroboration to support
probable cause. )
.
83 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1957) (The
detailed description of the suspect given by the informant and his
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A distinction must be drawn between arrest and search.
As a general principle, a warrant is required for a
search, 85 whereas a warrantless seizure of an individual may-
be lawful if the probable cause standard is satisfied. 86
Nevertheless, under the Payton rule, a warrantless arrest in
the suspect's premises violates the Fourth Amendment
provisions . 87
The warrant must describe with precision the place to
be searched or the person or things to be seized. 88
Nevertheless, a warrant failing to meet the particularity
standard may be reliable unless this irregularity would have
been discovered by a reasonably well-trained officer. 89
prior accurate tips make his information in this case reliable even
though he did not indicate the basis for his tip.) .
84 In comparison, the French Cour de cassation refused to
consider that an anonymous telephone call provided sufficient basis to
invoke flagrancy and therefore to legalize body and premises searches
of the persons suspected of using drugs. It held that an external sign
(indice apparent) is a prerequisite to characterize flagrancy and
therefore, to conduct a search without the consent of the suspect. See
Judgment of Feb. 2, 1988, Cass. crim.
,
(Diaz), 1988 Bull. Crim. , No.
52, at 142-45 (Fr.) . In this case, the Cour de cassation maintains its
position vis-a-vis the conditions of flagrancy.
85 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990) ("The
general rule [is] that warrantless searches are presumptively
unreasonable . " )
.
86 See United Sates v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) .
87 See Payton v. United States, 445 U.S. 573, 573 (1980) ("The
Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.
Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be
crossed without a warrant.").
88 U.S. Const, amend. IV providing that "[N]o Warrants shall be
issued, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
89 See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) .
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Some scholars relying upon foreign criminal procedures
support a warrant requirement limited to searches of
buildings' structures or curtilage. 90
2. An exception in France: The formal judicial investigatory
The French law enforcers conducting searches or
seizures are not required to act under a warrant except once
a formal judicial investigation is conducted within an
instruction. 91 The investigating judge (j'uge d ' instruction)
may proceed to any act necessary to the manifestation of the
truth 92 that are gathered into a dossier. He will decide
whether there is sufficient cause to remand a defendant to
trial. 93 Even though competent to investigate, the examining
judge usually delegates his powers to the judicial police
officers under a written order called a rogatory commission
(commission rogatoire) . The Criminal Procedure Code admits
those delegations of powers when the investigating judge
cannot conduct himself the investigation. They are routinely
90 See Craig M. Bradley, The Courts "Two Model" approach to the
Fourth Amendment: Carpe Diem!, 84 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 429, 444
(1993) .
91 See supra note 12. We have stressed the existence of the
prosecutor's supervision of the police acting in a flagrancy inquiry
as well as in a preliminary one. The law officers inform the
prosecutor of their investigating researches by sending him reports
[proces verbal). The investigating search or seizure does not need to
be judicially approved. Thus, the initiative to conduct a search or
seizure belongs to the police officers' discretion.
92 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 81 al 1 (Fr.).
93 One of the interests of the instruction relies on the
examining judge's power to place the suspect under a preventive
detention
.
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given. This substitution of competences does not concern
certain acts reserved exclusively to the juge d ' instruction
such as searches in a lawyer's or doctor's office or in a
press enterprise. 94 An instruction is mandatory only for
felonies (crimes). Therefore, the judicial supervision over
police officers is rather limited because more than 90% of
all the offenses are not preceded by an instruction. 95
An author has pointed out the lack of legal discussion
in France about information necessary to provide a
sufficient basis for the magistrate's belief. 96 The warrant
provides the nature of the offense investigated that is the
object of the prosecution. 97 A rogatory commission may be
general and may encompass any investigatory act. There is no
need to indicate the name of the suspect and his address. 98
However, such a generality concerning the offenses
prosecuted is prohibited. In other words, a warrant
94 See C. Pr. Pen. arts. 56-1 al 1,2; 56-2 (Fr.). Similarly,
once there is an instruction, suspects can no longer be interrogated
by the police, see C. Pr . Pen. art 152 al 2 (Fr.).
95 Moreover, the practice of "correctionalization" undermines
this judicial supervision. In this situation, the suspect is charged
with a lesser offense, a delit, to avoid a criminal jury trial before
the Cour d'Assises
,
only French court composed with a jury. Therefore,
this practice permits the defendant to be tried only by professional
judges before the tribunal correctionnel . In France, the initial
jurisdiction of criminal matters belongs to three categories of
courts: the Tribunal de police (least serious offenses), the Tribunal
correctionnel (middle-range offenses), the Cour d'assises (felonies).
96 See Tomlinson, The French Experience, supra note 3, at 184-
85.
97 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 151, 152 (Fr.).
98 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 94 (Fr.) (This article holds that
searches are permissible in places where seizable objects "may be
found" and may be useful to the manifestation of the truth.)
.
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concerning a group of offenses without determining them will
be held illegal."
B. Execution of the written order
1 . The staleness rule
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Fed. R. Crim.
P. 41(c) (1)) require the search warrant's execution within
ten days, whereas the arrest warrant is not bound by such a
rule. Moreover, probable cause must exist until the time of
execution. The underlying rationale of this rule is the
possibility that probable cause becomes stale. Generally,
the warrant search or seizure must be executed only during
daytime (from 9 a.m. to 10 p.m.) . However, the magistrate
may extend its execution under the condition to justify his
decision. Furthermore, a daytime search that continues into
the night may be held valid. 100
There is no French equivalent to the staleness rule.
However, the French investigating judge sets time limit for
the rogatory commissions' transmission to his office.
Otherwise, the judicial police officers have a delay of
eight days after the execution of warrant to send their
99 See Judgment of Mar. 21, 1957, Cass, crim., 1957 Bull. Crim.,
No. 278 (Fr. )
.
100 See United States v. Burgard, 551 F.2d 190 (CA8 Mo. 1977).
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reports. 101 Similarly, a daytime search or seizure is
required under the French Code for the three inquiries
previously mentioned (from 6 a.m. to 9 p.m.) 102 with the
exceptions of drugs and pandering offenses. 103
2. Discretion of the police officers
The American police officers' discretion such as the
means used, the degree of coercion required, governs the
warrant's execution. Nevertheless, the basic Fourth
Amendment reasonableness requirement must be satisfied. This
standard has been "stretched" by the U.S Supreme Court in
the "drug courier profiles" cases. 104
Under a search warrant, the police officers can seize
incriminating items, contraband, instruments of the offense
such as burglary tools and, mere evidence of criminal
activity (Fed. R. Crim. P.41(b)).
The general delegation under the French warrant permits
the judicial police officers to decide to search a
particular place, to initiate a dwelling search. However,
dwelling searches require the person whom the premises are
searched to be present. If she is not available, she names
someone to represent her. In case of impossibility, the
101 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 151 al 4 (Fr.).
102 See c> Pr _ P£n _ art _ 59 (pr.).
103 See C. Pr. Pen. arts. 706-30, 706-37 (Fr.).
104 See Galloway, Eclipse, supra note 79, at 15 citing United
States v. Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed. 2d 1 (1989).
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judicial police officer chooses two witnesses except
persons' subject to his authority. 105 Moreover, all the
investigatory acts are reported in proces verbaux signed by
the police officer himself as well as the persons witnessing
the operations. 106 An issue arises when the police officers,
while searching evidence of the offense listed in the
warrant, find incriminating items that are not related with
this particular offense. The Cour de cassation recognizes
the police officers' right to inform the investigating judge
about this evidence. 107 The body searches may also be
conducted under a rogatory commission. Finally, the judicial
police in charge of the warrant's execution are the only
authorities who can look at the documents before seizing
them. 108 The above proceedings limit the French
investigation's powers and guarantee individual liberties.
It has been stressed that the examining judge's
involvement in the investigation and his authority to
delegate powers to the police are foreign proceedings in the
American criminal procedure. 109 Thus, a magistrate's
participation to a search in an adult bookstore to seize
pornographic items not listed in the warrant was held
105 See c Pr _ Pen _ art _ 57 al 1( 2 (Fr.).
106 See c> Pr _ Pen
_ arts . 57 a i 3 ( 65 (Fr.). It must be
emphasized that the above formalities concerning dwelling searches
also applied to the preliminary and flagrancy inquiries.
107 See Judgment of Jan. 14, 1992, Cass. crim. , 1992 Bull.
Crim. , No. 13 ( Fr
.
)
.
108 See c Pr _ Pen
_ art _ 97 al x ( Fr .). The investigating judge
has also the right to examine them before undertaking their seizure.
109 See Frase, supra note 4, at 668.
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inadmissible. The "neutral and detached magistrate"
requirement was not met. 110
3 . The "Knock and Notice" requirement
This rule based on Common Law requires the American law
enforcers to state their identity and purpose before
entering into a dwelling. Thus, the individual has the
opportunity to "peacefully surrender his privacy" 111 and to
prevent a violent entry. According to the general view, the
rule serves individual's privacy and the police officers'
mistaken interferences. 112 The U.S. Supreme Court held that
prior notice is "deeply rooted in our heritage." 113 It
applies to arrests' warrants and to warrantless searches.
The Federal statutory provisions related to the announcement
requirement 114 are broadly construed. The phrase "house"
encompasses any building within the curtilage, apartments,
and motel rooms. 115 Once the law authorities have announced
110 See Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
111 See John Wesley Hall, Jr., Search and Seizure § 44:2. (2nd
ed. 1991)
.
112 Id.
113 See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958).
114 18 U.S.C. § 3109 states:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window
of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to
execute search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and
purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to
liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of
the warrant.
115 See 18 U.S.C. A § 3109
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their entry, a denial of entry authorizes use of force. For
example, surrounding circumstances or silence may show a
denial of entry. The notice of authority and purpose rule
does not apply when exigent circumstances exist or if the
person is aware of the offices' purpose and authority. 116
Moreover, some states have adopted "No knock and Notice"
statutes and certain allow "no-knock" warrant in other
jurisdictions even though the state legislature has not
enacted any exception to the notice and purpose
requirement
.
117
The numerous and broad exceptions to the
"reasonableness," probable cause and warrant requirements
threaten the privacy rights. These exceptions have
"swallowed" the principles protecting the individual
liberties
.
116 See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); United States v.
Spinelli, 848 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1988).
117 See Charles Patrick Garcia, The Knock and Announce Rule: A
New Approach to the Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93 Colum. L.
Rev. 685, 700 (1993). This article emphasizes that the "war on drugs"
has lead the courts to adopt a "blanket rule" authorizing the law
enforcers to break down premises' doors in narcotics' cases without
any need to state their authority and aim. For a state pattern, see
William W. Daniel, Georgia Criminal Trial Practice, § 4-16 (1994). The
issuance of a "no-knock" warrant showing the potential danger to the
police and destruction of evidence was approved in one Georgia case.
See Jones v. state, 127 Ga . App. 137, 193 S. E. 2d 38 (1972).
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II. A narrow or limited approach to judicial supervision
The effects of the "Criminal Procedure Counter
Revolution" clearly appear in the field of searches and
seizures. 118 The Warren Court from 1961 to 19 69 has been said
to be defendant-oriented. It extended the Due Process
Fundamental Fairness principle. 119 On the contrary, the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts have "eclipse [d]
"
120 the Fourth
Amendment safeguards. In France absence of a general
judicial warrant requirement facilitates the pre-trial
investigatory function to the detriment of citizens' rights.
A. Consent search
1. Necessity of a consent in the French preliminary
investigation
Police receive information concerning commission of an
offense either through their own observations or from the
reports of citizens. Then, they initiate a preliminary
inquiry. We have previously stressed the non-coercive aspect
118 See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., First Things Last: Amendomania
and State Bills of Rights, 54 Miss L.J. 223 (1984) . See also
Wasserstrom, Silas J., The Incredible Shrinking of Fourth Amendment,
21 Am. Crim. L . Rev . 257 (1984)
.
119 Thus, even though the states did not violate a specific
provision of the Bill of Rights, Due Process concept was violated if
the state's proceedings were fundamentally unfair.
120 See Galloway, Eclipse, supra note 79.
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of this police investigation. 121 Therefore, in a preliminary-
inquiry there is no arrest power with the exception of the
individual going voluntarily to the police station.
Searches and seizures require the written consent of
the person whose domicile is searched. 122 The consent is a
mandatory prerequisite to a search conducted, only during
legal hours except for terrorism offenses, either by an
officer or an agent of judicial police. The consenting
person mentions in the report his knowledge of his right to
refuse. 123 When one cannot write, the proceedings must show
that he was aware of his right to refuse. Nevertheless, the
Cour de cassation held no consent was required for a
surveillance with a pair of binoculars. This surveillance
falls outside the domicile's protection. The U.S Supreme
Court approved an aerial surveillance in California v.
Ciraolo 124 and in Florida v. Riley. 125 According to the Court,
surveillance from an aircraft flying at 1000 or 400 feet did
121 See supra plO of the thesis.
122 The legal notion of domicile is defined broadly. Thus, any
lived-in place falls within the legal concept. Thus, the Cour de
cassation invalidated a search conducted in a hotel room without the
consent of his occupant by relying on the sanctity of the domicile
protected in Article 226-4 of the new Penal Code. See Judgment of May
30, 1980, Cass. crim. , 1980 Bull. Crim. , No. 165 (Fr.). However,
vehicles as well as left-luggage lockers have not been assimilated to
domiciles
.
123 See C. Pr. Pen. arts. 75, 76 (Fr.). The latter states:
Searches, domiciliary visits and seizures of evidence to be
used against the defendant may not be effected without the
express consent of the person on whose property the operation
takes place. (last part omitted)
.
124 476 U.S. 207, 39 Crl 3106 (1986).
125 488 U.S. 445, 44 CrL 3079 (1986).
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not amount to a search. No reasonable expectation of privacy-
was found. Those two decisions pointed out the absence of
any physical interferences with residents' yard.
Some authors have narrowly interpreted Article Seventy-
six of the Criminal Procedure Code, requiring an express
consent, to argue that the prerequisite consent to search
does not bind vehicles searches during a preliminary
inquiry. 126 However, the courts do not follow this approach.
Similarly, a body search is limited to the consent of the
person unless it is a protective frisk. Therefore, the
problem is to draw a line between body search and protective
frisk.
2. Evaporation of the probable cause standard as well as the
warrant requirement
a. Free consent
The consent must be voluntary. 127 The "voluntariness"
standard is appreciated under the totality of circumstances
encompassing the competence, the mental condition of the
person consenting, her knowledge of her right to refuse, her
126 See supra note 123; See also Pierre Chambon, Ouverture du
coffre d'un vehicule dans le cadre d'une enguete preliminaire, 1984
J.C.P II 20213 sous Tribunal correctionnel Toulon, Judgment of Apr.
26, 1983 (Fr.).
127 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227; 93 S.Ct.
2041, 36 L.Ed. 2d 854 (1973).
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cooperation or resistance, and police coercive conduct. 128
Similarly, the temporal scope of the consent is examined
under the totality of the circumstances. 129 The prosecution
sustaining a search as consensual has to prove existence of
a consent "by clear and convincing evidence." 130
b. Consent by a third party
The wife or husband131 as well as roommates can agree to
a search of the areas over which they have common
authority. 132 The underlying rationale to the rule relies on
the assumption of risk. 133 Furthermore, a reasonable police
officer's belief of an apparent authority makes the consent
valid. 134 His reasonable mistake of fact in contrast to a
legal one does not void the search. 135
128 See Galloway, supra note 69, at 760.
129 See H. Patrick Furman, The Consent Exception to the Warrant
Requirement, 23 Colo. Law. 2105 (1994)
.
130 However, a preponderance of evidence may be sufficient to
prove a voluntary consent under state-law. See Hall, supra note 109,
at § 8:11. Nonetheless, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 1 (1983), states
the "clear and convincing evidence" test as the general standard.
131 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022,
29 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1971)
.
132 Similarly, a parent may consent to his child's bedroom, an
employer may also consent to a search of an employee's work or his
storage areas. See Generally Hall, supra note 109, at §§ 8: 31-8: 52.
133 See Ronald L. Carlson, Criminal Justice Procedure, § 2.2
(4th ed. 1991)
.
134 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111
L.Ed. 2d 65 (1983)
.
135 See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11
L.Ed. 2d 856 (1964). The Court refused to extend the third party
consent to an officer's mistake as to someone's legal authority.
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3 . Dilution of the consent
In both countries, police can put pressure on the
individuals to obtain a consent. In France, the availability
of a detention up to 24 hours {la garde a vue) provides the
police with an effective threat. In the American procedure,
the totality of the circumstances' test permits more easily
to find a voluntary consent. The prosecutor is not required
to prove that the individual was informed of his right to
refuse. 136 The failure to give Fourth Amendment warnings is
irrelevant where the defendant "had been arrested and was in
custody, but his consent was given while on a public street,
not in the confines of the police station." 137 A person who
is not aware of her right to refuse to consent to a search
will not be protected by the constitutional provision if her
consent is found voluntary under other factors. Ones have
argued than uneducated people will be more "willing" to
consent because they are not aware of their right to
refuse
.
138
136 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232-33 (1973)
[consenting person has no right to be advised of his right to refuse)
.
137 See united States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976).
138 See Galloway, Eclipse, supra note 79, at 18.
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B. Emergency situations
Exigent circumstances and hot pursuit cases permit
American law enforcers to derogate to the warrant
requirement protecting privacy in one's home and one's
property. Their French counterparts operating in a flagrancy
investigation have broader powers to search and seize
evidence or person than in a preliminary inquiry.
1 . A broad concept
a. Flagrancy
The judicial police officers have sometimes
characterized ordinary offenses as flagrant ones to search
and seize an individual without his consent. This issue has
arisen in drug detention and illegal aliens cases. In those
situations, the individual does not present any external
proof of his actual criminal activity. These offenses are
difficult to detect because of their occult aspect.
The construction of the term "flagrant" divides the
scholars. For some of them, a flagrancy situation is that
which appears to the individual ' s senses . Other rely more
precisely on objective signs 139 whereas other ones assimilate
139 See Judgment of Jan. 22, 1953 (Isnard case), Cass. crim.
,
1953 J.C.P. II 7456 rapport Brouchot (Fr.).
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flagrancy offenses with emergency situations. Finally,
another view grounded on Article Fifty-three of the Criminal
Procedure Code holds that there is flagrancy when the
offense is actually committed without any need to see it. 140
The French case-law requires objective signs that an offense
has occurred and is still "flagrant" 141 The reports filled by
the police must indicate that those signs were present. The
jurisprudence of Cour de Cassation has held that a flagrancy
inquiry must follow a flagrant offense and not the opposite.
The problem is to determine what constitutes objectives'
signs of flagrancy. Thus, a tip from an anonymous informant
is not a sufficient basis to characterize an external sign142
in contrast to the victim's testimony. 143 Nevertheless, an
apparent clue of a flagrant offense makes its seizure by a
judicial police agent valid. 144 Moreover, a person's change
of walking direction at the sight of the police officers is
sufficient to open a flagrancy inquiry. 145 Furthermore, the
140 See Mer i e et vitu, Traite de Droit Criminel, (4th ed. 1989)
.
See also Judgment of May 30, 1980, Cass. crim. , 1980 Bull. Crim. No.
165 at 411, 1981 D.P. Jurisprudence 533 note Wilfrid Jeandidier (Fr.).
141 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 53 (Fr.): "The felony or delict that is
in the process of being committed or which has just been committed is
a flagrant felony or flagrant delict." See also Judgment of Jan. 4,
1982, Cass, crim., 1982 Bull. Crim., No. 2 (Fr.).
142 See Judgment of July 21, 1982, Cass, crim., 1982 D.P. 642
(Fr. ) .
143 See Judgment of Oct. 8, 1985, Cass, crim., 1985 Bull. Crim.
No. 301 (Fr. )
.
144 See Judgment of March 2, 1993, Cass, crim., 1993 Bull.
Crim., No. 93 (Fr.) (The judicial police agents seized a weapon from a
damaged vehicle involved in a death accident. They noticed it while
they were removing the vehicle.)
.
145 See Judgment of Jan. 4, 1982, Cass, crim., 1982 Bull. Crim.
No. 2 (Fr. )
.
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victim's testimony of a future offense (bribe) was held
relevant to characterize an appearance of the criminal
activity. One author has wondered how the Court could rely
on an appearance sign of an offense not yet occurred. 146 In
the Trignol case, the Cour de cassation validated a vehicle
search without requiring an external proof and even though
the search occurred several days after the commission of the
offense (kidnapping) . 147 One may wonder whether the "end
justifies the means."
b. Exigency situations
The exigent circumstances 148 under American case law
constitute a growing area since 1925. 149 They encompass the
threat of loss of evidence, 150 physical danger to police
officers, 151 to third parties and even to suspects, danger of
146 See Judgment of Apr. 22, 1992, Cass. crim. , 1995 D. Jur . 59
note Haritimi Matsopoulou (Fr. )
.
147 Judgment of Nov. 8, 1979, Cass, crim., 1980 J.C.P. I No.
2983 (Fr.). The critics of this case focused on the Court's
interpretation of flagrancy. Article 56 of the criminal procedure Code
holds that searches and seizures concern the persons suspected to be
engaged in a criminal activity. Here none suspicion existed against
Mr. Trignol who was one of numerous citizens searched. Therefore, the
French Court relied on an extensive notion of flagrancy.
148 See Generally Hall, supra note 111, at § 7
.
149 See Carroll v. United states, 267 U.S. 132, 150-53. The
mobility of the automobile creates an emergency allowing a warrantless
search because the driver could flee the locality.
150 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L.Ed. 2d 441,
83 S. Ct. 407 (1963)
.
151 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct
.
1868 (1968) (A reasonable suspicion the suspect is armed during a
street encounter creates exigent circumstances justifying a frisk on
less than probable cause)
.
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escape, hot pursuit, 152 and the automobile exception. The
courts also focus on the amount of time necessary to obtain
a warrant and on the gravity of the underlying offense. 153
Most of the American exigent situations are flagrant.
Nevertheless, this exception to the warrant requirement also
applies to offenses that are no longer "flagrant" such as an
entry based on a recent tip in an old case. 154
2. Broad investigative police powers
a. Body search
The French law enforcers acting in a flagrancy
situation do not need a prior judicial authorization to an
individual's search assimilated to a perquisition. 155
Moreover, no daytime rule applies but the body search must
be conducted by a police officer with the same sex of the
person frisked. 156
Originally, under the American case Terry v. Ohio, the
law enforcers could search a suspect and seize dangerous
items such as weapons to protect them. This protective frisk
152 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18
L.Ed. 2d 782 (1967) .
153 See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80
L.Ed. 2d 732 (1984) (The Court held the entry in defendant's home to
arrest him for a traffic-violation illegal).
154 See Frase, supra note 4, at 579.
155 See supra note 46.
156 See Picard, supra note 37.
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was limited to the outer of the clothes. The search may not
go beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is
armed. 157 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has expanded the
scope of the frisk to places 158 and drug detention. Thus, a
pat down and a strip search of a person suspected of hiding
drugs in her alimentary canal was held valid. 159
b. Premises or buildings search
The inviolability of a private area such as the
suspect's home is set aside when exigent circumstances exist
under American case-law. Thus, a warrantless entry in one's
home 160 or a warrantless entry of a third person's premises 161
does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The "Knock and
Announcement" requirement does not apply. In Segura v.
United States, 162 the Court held that the police did not
violate the Fourth Amendment when after a warrantless entry
in the suspect's home, they remained inside for several
157 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. 2130 (1993) (An
officer while patting down a suspect prolonged his frisk to identify
an object even though he knew it was not weapon.)
.
158 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (The passenger
compartment of the individual stopped may be searched even though the
suspect has stepped out of his vehicle.)
.
159 See united States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531
(1985) (The defendant was detained 16 hours without any judicial
authorization. However, this detention was not deemed unreasonable.).
160 See payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 73, 100 S.Ct. 1471, 63
L.Ed. 2d 639 (1980) .
161 See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642,
68 L.Ed. 2d 38 (1981) .
162 See segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 380, 82
L.Ed. 2d 599 (1984) .
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hours, while the suspect was in custody. The seizures were
not deemed unreasonable despite the absence of a threat of
destruction.
The French police, searching in a domicile, must
respect the proceedings previously described. 163 The Criminal
Procedure Code authorizes domicile search of all persons
having participated in the offense or having incriminating
evidence. 164 The police officers only seize the documents
necessary to their investigation. They can undertake
searches and seizures at any time within "places frequented
by the public when it has been established that persons
engaged in prostitution are habitually received here." 165
Similarly, searches of places where drugs are used in
community, fabricated or stocked are no bound by the daytime
rule. 166
In both countries, the law enforcers may search the
scene of a flagrant crime167 or the homicide scene without a
warrant 168 and seize incriminating evidence.
163 See supra notes 105, 106.
164 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 56 (Fr.).
165 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 706-35 (Fr.).
166 See c pr _ P£n _ art> 706-28 (Fr.).
167 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 54 (Fr.). Moreover, the French law
officers acting in a flagrancy inquiry can designate experts to
conduct scientific examination (C. Pr . Pen. art. 60), can detain
persons on the scene (C. Pr
.
Pen. art. 61), can summon and interrogate
any person holding information about the case (C. Pr . Pen. art 62) and
can place witnesses and suspects in investigatory detention (C. Pr
.
Pen. art. 63 ) (Fr. )
.
168 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) .
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C. Vehicle motor searches: A lesser expectation of privacy
1. "Erosion" of the Fourth Amendment Guarantees
In this area, the traditional holding that "searches
conducted without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions" seems meaningless. 169
a. Emergency justification for a search
First, the U.S. Supreme Court in Carroll v. United
states, 170 held that the mobility of the vehicle created
exigent circumstances, e.g., threat of destruction of
evidence, authorizing a warrantless search. 171 However,
probable cause to believe that there was incriminating
evidence had to be demonstrated. The holding was limited to
immediate search. 172
169 This holding is found in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
341, 357 (1967); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825
(1982); see also California v. Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991).
See Lisa K. Coleman, California v. Acevedo: The Erosion of the Fourth
Amendment Right to be Free from Unreasonable Searches, 22 Men. St. U.
L. Rev. 831 (1992) (The author stresses the "great departure from the
warrant requirement" in Acevedo.) [hereinafter Coleman, Erosion of the
Fourth Amendment]
.
170 267 U.S. 132 (1925) .
171 id. at 149, 153.
172 Id. at 134, 36.
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Then, the automobile exception was extended in Chambers
v. Maroney173 to warrantless searches conducted once there
was no more emergency. The occupants of the car had been
taken to the police station. Nevertheless, exigent
circumstances had to be present at the time of the seizure.
b. Privacy expectation in containers within the vehicle
Primarily, the Court in United States v. Chadwick,
refused to apply the vehicle's exception to a search of a
footlocker within the automobile. 174 Probable cause to the
containers alone was deemed insufficient. 175 Therefore, such
a warrantless search of property was unreasonable because of
no fear of loss of evidence. The second step was to allow a
warrantless search of containers when there was probable
cause to the entire vehicle. In United States v. Ross, 176 the
Court made a complex distinction between probable cause to
search an automobile and probable cause to search a
container only. In the first situation, the privacy
expectation in any containers "yield [ed] to the authority of
[an automobile] search." 177 On the contrary, a warrant was
required in the second hypothetical. It was pointed out that
173 399 U.S. 42 (1970) .
174 433 U.S. 1 (1977) .
175 Id. at 13.
176 456 U.S. 798 (1982) .
177 Id. at 823.
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police officers could rely on false probable cause to the
whole vehicle to search it. 178
Finally, the trend toward the weakening of the Fourth
Amendment appeared clearly in California v. Acevedo. 179 The
Court abolished the ambiguous distinction made in Ross
between probable cause to search an automobile and probable
cause to search a container only. A warrantless search of
the containers based only on probable cause to those
containers is lawful. 180 The Court's reasoning is grounded on
the inefficiency of the Chadwick rule. This later "provided
only minimal protection for privacy" and had "impeded
effective law enforcement." 181 One can doubt of the greater
privacy protection provided under the new holding because of
the creation of one more exception to the warrant
requirement. 182 The doctrine stressed the absence of
identification of any factors making the search reasonable
such as the mobility of the vehicle or a threat of loss of
evidence. Even though those justifications were not present,
the reasonableness standard was satisfied. In the area of
vehicles' searches, the interests of law enforcement
undermine the individual's privacy.
169.
169.
178 Wayne R. Lafave, Criminal Procedure § 3.7 (c) (1987)
179 See Coleman, Erosion of the Fourth Amendment, supra note
180 Id at 1991.
181 Id at 1988-91.
182 See Coleman, Erosion of the Fourth Amendment, supra note
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2. French courts' refusal to extent the domicile's
protection to vehicles
The Cour de cassation as well as the Conseil
constitutionnel refuse to include vehicles in the legal
notion of domicile except for the vehicles used as premises
(mobile home). 183 Therefore, the protection afforded to
private places does not apply to vehicles. One may wonder
why a lesser expectation of privacy governs vehicles search.
The law enforcers acting within an administrative mission
are not allowed to search vehicles except specialized agents
such as customs personnel. On the contrary, such searches
during flagrancy inquiries are lawful if the conditions of
flagrancy are met. 184
The French Constitutional Council in its decision of
January 12, 1977, invalidated a law expanding the power of
police to search automobiles. 185 The challenged bill required
neither the commission of an offense nor a threat to public
safety to conduct vehicle searches. The vehicle had only to
be on a road open to traffic and the driver had to be
present during the search. The general search investigatory
powers provided in the bill were deemed unconstitutional.
183 See Judgment of Sept. 11, 1933, Cass. crim. , 1933 Bull.
Crim. No. 267; Judgment of Nov. 8, 1979 (Trignol case), Cass, crim.,
1979 J.C.P. II 19337 (Fr. )
.
184 rpj^g j ur i Sprudence of the Cour de cassation stresses that a
speed limit violation punished by a contravention even though
flagrante does not authorize a vehicle search.
185 Decision of Jan. 12, 1977, Con. const., J.O. Jan. 13, 1977
(Fr. ) .
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However, the Constitutional Council did not declare all
searches of automobiles unconstitutional. Therefore,
individual liberty may be set aside when an offense or a
threat to public order is characterized. This decision has
extended the notion of individual liberty. 186
In the Trignol case, an individual refused to open his
trunk. He was prosecuted under Article L4 of the Highway
Code. 187 Mr. Trignol relied on the Constitutional Council's
decision to argue the unconstitutionality of the search.
Despite the decision of the Constitutional Council, the Cour
de cassation held the search valid by relying on a different
statute (art. L4) . The Court grounded the legality of the
search by "stretching" the concept of f lagrancy
.
188 Moreover,
Article L4 was broadly construed to encompass not only
highway safety verifications but also judicial investigation
searches . 189
186 The notions of surety (the searches would have taken place
on a public way) and inviolability of domicile (the vehicle is not a
domicile) were not concerned.
187 This article requires a motorist to submit to all police
verifications concerning the condition of his vehicle.
188 See supra note 147
.
189 See Vroom, The Conseil Cons t i tutionnel , supra note 55, at
186-89.
CHAPTER III: INVESTIGATORY RESTRAINTS ON THE RIGHT OF
LOCOMOTION
I . Investigatory stops
A. Requirement of a reasonable suspicion
1. Abandonment of the probable cause requirement
In the leading case Terry v. Ohio, 190 a stop and frisk
by a police officer was held constitutionally permissible on
reasonable suspicion grounds. It was a great change in the
Court position toward warrantless arrests not based upon
probable cause. Several men attracted the attention of a
police officer. This later approached them for questioning,
and frisked them. The detective patted Terry's breast pocket
and felt a weapon which was then seized. The U.S Supreme
Court held that "specific and articulate facts which taken
together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant" the intrusion. 191 However, the intrusion
was limited in scope and purpose. Thus, the frisk of the
outer clothing was allowed only to locate weapons to protect
190 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
191 Id. at 21.
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police officers. Moreover, the police officers' experience
must have lead them to conclude that a criminal activity may
be afoot. 192 Suspicion alone such as association with known
criminals cannot justify an investigatory stop. 193
It has been point out that the post Terry cases require
less and less evidence to stop and frisk someone. 194 The
problem is that more and more investigatory stops look like
arrests. From now on, an individual may be accosted by a law
enforcer, stopped on reasonable suspicion or arrested on
probable cause.
2 . Controversial identity checks in France
a. Political issue
The French legislator collections the statutes in this
area. Each time a new legislative majority is elected, it
will enact a new law about identity checks. In 1981 the law
"Security and Liberty" regulated the identity checks by the
judicial police acting within an administrative mission.
Thus, a prevention of a breach of the public order
authorizes such identity checks. Even though these
administrative identity checks conducted the judicial police
192 Id. at 27.
193 See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
194 David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and
Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 Ind. L.J. 659 (1994)
.
57
by were not allowed before 1981, they were routinely
conducted. 195 The statute's provisions on identity checks
were challenged before the Constitutional Council on two
grounds: violation of individual liberty and separation of
powers inherent in giving to the judicial police functions
normally within the field of the administrative police. The
Constitutional Council did not really take position on the
constitutionality of an identity control outside any
offense. The restrictions on the individuals' rights were
outweigh by superior interests. Moreover, the guarantees
providing by the law were deemed sufficiently protective of
the individuals' rights. The Constitutional Council held
"[i]t is up to the judicial and administrative authorities
to see to the respect of those rules and guarantees provided
for by the legislator, as well as to the competent courts to
censure and reprimand, should the situation arise, any
illegalities committed.
"
196
In 1983, a new statute stated that preventive identity
checks could be conducted in determined places where the
195 rp^g identity checks were theoretically allowed only in three
cases: "flagrant" delict, traffic's violations and during an
administrative mission conducted by the gendarmes . However, the Cour
de cassation held that a preventive (administrative) identity check by
the judicial police was lawful. See Judgment of Jan. 5, 1973 (Friedel
case), Cass. crim. , 1973 Bull. Crim. , No . 7 , 1973 D. Jur 541 note
Roujou de Boubee (Fr.) . See supra note 19. Several complaints relying
on the illegality of a preventive identity check by the judicial
officers were filled in 1980. Then, the police decided to conduct only
repressive identity checks to oblige the Legislature to take position.
196 See Decision of Aug. 27, 1986, Con. const., Fr
.
, 1986 J.O.
10439 (Fr.) citing decision "Security and Liberty" of Jan. 19-20,
1981, Con. const., Fr
.
, Jan 22, 1981 J.O. 308 (Fr.).
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security of persons and property was "immediately"
threatened. The Cour de cassation considered that an
appellate court's motivation based only on general frequency
of crime in the subway to justify identity control was
insufficient. 197 It was necessary to specify in what way the
security of persons and goods were "immediately" threatened.
The 1983 statute was modified in 1986 to come back to the
previous rules of 1981. It was referred to the
Constitutional Council which found the suppression of the
term "immediate" to be consistent with the Constitution.
Finally, the recent criminal procedure reform of 1993 has
once again modified the prior rules in a more restrictive
way as regard to individuals' rights.
b. Situations of restraint of the right of locomotion
Under the actual Criminal Procedure Code, a person may
be asked to justify her identity when the police act within
a judicial (repressive) mission either during a preliminary
inquiry or during a flagrant investigation. 198 Even though
197 See Judgment of Oct. 4, 1984 (Kande case), Cass. crim. , 1984 Bull
Crim., No. 287, 1985 J.C.P. II 2039 note J. Buisson (Fr.).
198 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 78-2 al 1 (Fr.):
The Officers of the judicial police [part omitted] may invite
to justify his identity by any means, any person in regard to
whom there exists an indication causing it to be presumed:
that he has committed or attempted to commit an offense;
or that he is preparing to commit a felony or a delict;
or that he is likely to furnish information useful to an
inquiry in the case of a felony or a delict;
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the identity card is not mandatory in France, the document
showed by the person must be sufficiently reliable.
Therefore, this judicial identity control which has not been
reformed in 1993 is based on an individualized suspicion.
The police officers conducting an administrative
identity controls, e.g., to prevent a breach of the public
order, 199 have been required by the Cour de cassation to
indicate why the security of persons and property were
threatened. 200 The Cour went further, and held that the
prevention of a breach of the public order must be directly
related to the person's behavior whose identity is
controlled. 201 Thus, in this 1992 case, the 1986 version of
the identity checks provisions had been read in conformity
with both, the respect of the individuals' rights, and the
Court's jurisprudence. 202 However, the Court's requirement
went beyond the terms of the Code. The Court's holding made
the distinction between judicial police mission and
administrative police mission more difficult to draw.
or that he is the object of a search ordered by a judicial
authority.
199 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 78-2 al 3 (Fr.)
.
200 See Judgment of May 27,1992, Paris Chambre d ' accusation,
1992 Droit Penal [Dr. penal] No. 216 (Fr.).
201 See Judgment of Nov. 10, 1992, Cass. crim. , 1993 Dr. penal,
No. 23 (Fr.)
.
The Court stressed that the law enforcers cannot simply
ground the identity control on the facts that two persons were
speaking in a foreign language in an area of high incidence of
larcenies
.
202 See Judgment of Oct. 4, 1984 (Kande case), Cass, crim., 1984
Bull. Crim., No. 287 (Fr.). See supra note 197.
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Nevertheless, the 1993 legislation has reduced the
scope of this case law by creating a new situation of
identity check: the requested control. 203 This identity check
is executed under the prosecutor's requisition to
investigate in specific places some offenses during a
limited period of time. The prosecutor must identify these
breaches of law. This control, without any particularity
requirement, is only based on the frequency of certain
offenses in a determinate area. The liberty of movement of
any individual is directly threatened.
The foreigners may be asked to prove their identity
under the above rules. Moreover, their conditions of stay in
France can be controlled. The jurisprudence held that such a
check must not be grounded on proper characteristics of the
person whose identity is controlled such as her skin's
color. Objective sign of alien status resulting from
"exterior circumstances" to the foreigner are required. 204
The phrase " circonstances exterieures" may encompass either
203 See c Pr _ P£n _ art _ 78 _2 a i 2 (Fr.).
204 see Judgment of Apr. 25, 1985 (Vuckovic and Bogdan cases),
Cass. crim. , 1985 Bull. Crim. , No. 159 (Fr.). The issue in those cases
was to know whether a statute relating to foreigners' police (decret
March 18, 1946) had been abolished by the 1983 provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code. This statute makes applicable the Ordonnance
of Nov. 2, 1945 requiring the foreigners to be able to present their
immigration papers at any time. The Court held that when there were
external signs of alien status, such as a foreign driver's license,
the control could be based on the decret. On the contrary when those
circumstances were not present, the identity control was bound by the
Code's provisions.
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a physical feature or a physical sign and other
characteristics such as clothes. 205
B. Enlargement of police powers
1. Expansion of investigatory stop and frisk
a. Weakness of the reasonable suspicion standard
The only fact that an individual was observed in an
area of "high incidence of drug traffic" was held
insufficient to justify a stop. 206 However, the trend has
changed, and the liberty of movement has been restricted.
From now on, an individual walking in a high crime area with
an "evasive" conduct may be stopped and frisked. 207 The
targets of those stops will be the disadvantaged American
minorities
.
The totality of the circumstances test permits the
courts to appreciate the legality of a stop. The police
officers experience or common sense is a determinative
parameter. 208 A comparison of the suspect with a "criminal
205 See Jeandidier, 1985 J.C.P. II 20465 (Fr.).
206 See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47-49 (1979). In this case, the
individual was stopped in an alley associated with drug trafficking, and he
refused to identify himself before being frisked. A Texas statute
criminalized the refusal to identify oneself.
207 See Harris, supra note 194.
208 See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981). See also
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 282 (1985)
.
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profile" outside of the context of any particular case may
satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard. 209 An individual
turning and walking in other direction after having left a
house known for cocaine traffic may be stopped. The
reasonable suspicion requirement of Terry is met. 210
Similarly, an anonymous tip but corroborated justifies a
stop. 211 Finally, a Terry stop of persons suspected of past
crimes when police have reasonable suspicion that the
individuals they encounter were involved in or were wanted
for a completed felony is constitutional. 212
The individualized suspicion requirement is set aside
when "highway sobriety checkpoints" are conducted by police
who stop every car and question the driver. 213
b. Stop or arrest?
An individual is seized when he cannot reasonably
believe that he is free to leave. 214 The Court stressed that
an individual can walk away when questioned by the police. 215
Approaching an individual in the street and asking him
209 See Harris, supra note 194.
210 See State v. Dickerson, 481 NW2d 840, 51 CrL 1021 (Minn.
Sup. Ct. 1992)
.
211 See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990); See also Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) . The tip must give indication of the
informant's basis of knowledge.
212 See united States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
213 See Michigan Dep ' t of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481
(1990) .
214 See united States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
215 Id. at 544.
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questions does not implicate the Fourth Amendment
provisions. 216 Thus, questioning factory's employees about
their citizenship while other agents stationed near exits
does not constitute a seizure. 217 Nonetheless, the U.S.
Supreme Court, relying on the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, invalidated a California Statute
requiring persons who loiter or wander to provide a
"credible and reliable" identification and to account of
their presence. 218 In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan
argued that under the Fourth Amendment, the police officers
acting within a Terry stop may ask investigative questions
"[b]ut they may not compel an answer, and they must allow
the person to leave after a reasonably brief period of time"
unless they have acquired probable cause to arrest him. 219
The degree of force use to interfere in one's right of
locomotion may determine if one is facing a stop or an
arrest. In Michigan v. Chesternut
,
220 the Court held that the
police chase of a suspect, who was discarding packets of
contraband while he was fleeing, was not a seizure. The
Court pointed out that no siren, no flash lights or weapons
were displayed. The degree of force used to characterize an
216 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491. 497 (1983).
217 See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984).
218 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, (1983). The failure to
clarify what was contemplated by the "credible and reliable"
identification requirement violated Due Process Clause.
219 id. at 366.
220 486 U.S. 567 (1988). In this case, the flight from the
police alone was deemed sufficient to meet the suspicious grounds
test
.
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arrest seems to be particularly high. Thus, the stop is not
converted into an arrest when a gun point or a weapon is
displayed, when one is frisked while facing a wall or lying
down and handcuffed. 221 Similarly, a "hard take down" of
suspects do not turn stop into arrest. 222 In those
situations, the suspect can hardly believe to be free to
walk away. Moreover, the reasonableness requirement under
the Terry doctrine seems far away. The "permissible reasons
for a stop and search and the permissible scope of the
intrusion have expanded beyond their original contours." 223
The use or display of force in making a stop is generally
justifies by the threatening surrounding circumstances.
Furthermore, the police are not obliged to use less
intrusive means yet available to ensure their safety. The
underlying rationale of this rule is the necessity for the
law enforcers to decide quickly which means are the more
appropriate to protect themselves.
c. Extensive search and seizure and narrow rights
221 See United States v. Lane, 909 F. 2d 895 (6th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Harrington, 923 F. 2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1991) /United
States v. Saffeels, 981 F. 2d 1560 (10th Cir. 1992).
222 See Lee v. State, 311 Md. 642, 537 A. 2d 235 (1988).
223 See united States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193 at 1198 (1990;
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A search warrant for contraband implicitly carries with
it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the
premise. Therefore, the Fourth amendment is not violated. 224
The scope of the frisk have been expanded to the
passenger compartment of a vehicle where a weapon might be
hidden although the suspect was handcuffed. 225 The area of
control doctrine of Chimel v. California226 is determined by
the potentiality of harm not by actual, physical control by
the suspect. 227 Similarly, airport search cases have extended
Terry to allow investigative detention of things. 228
The period of time of a seizure is also an essential
issue. The surrounding circumstances of cases will determine
whether the duration of the investigative detention was
reasonable. 229 The courts rely on the diligence of the police
officer to resolve the matter.
Finally, persons subjected to an ordinary traffic stop
are not entitled to Miranda rights 230 because those stops are
not deemed excessively intrusive.
224 See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 411 (1981) .
225 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) .
226 395 U.S. 752 (1969) .
227 Id.
228 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). Terry doctrine also applies for mailed
packages
.
229 See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (holding
the constitutionality of 20 minutes stop as well as 30 minutes
detention.) See also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). In
this case, the Court invalidated the detention of a traveler's luggage
for 90 minutes and recommending a maximum of 20 minutes.
230 See Berkermer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
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The "war on drugs" and the high rates of crimes lead
the judicial authorities to broaden the scope of
investigatory stops and to narrow the constitutional
guarantees. 231 Some commentators point out that the cases
reported focus only on individuals charged with an
offense. 232 There is no statistics on the number of
investigatory stops producing no incriminating evidence. 233
2. Temporary seizure for an identification under French law
The French identification procedure is far more
intrusive than a Terry stop. If the person is unable to
prove her identity or refuse, she can be seized and
conducted to the police station house for a detention up to
four hours to verify her identity. 234 She is only retained
for the time strictly required to establish her identity.
The person is immediately presented to a judicial
police officer who must give her all the means available to
prove her identity. The individual seized has a right to
inform the prosecutor of his situation. He can also notice
any person of his choice. The prosecutor may decide to end
231 It has been said that the "Bill of rights in general and the
Fourth Amendment in particular are profoundly ant i -government
documents." See Anthony G. Amesterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 353 (1974).
232 See supra note 16, at 679.
233 See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The Crime Statistics That We
Would Like to See, Zeitgeist pl2 ( Spring 1992)
.
234 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 78-3 (Fr.).
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the detention, to order a medical exam, and to verify the
legality of the official reports.
Inaccurate information providing by the individual, or
a refusal to cooperate permit the police, with the
prosecutor's authorization, to take his fingerprints or
photographs. 235 This police power is also available when no
other means would establish one's identity, and is
sanctioned by imprisonment and fine. 236
The police officer is required to mention in the proces
verbaux the reasons of the control as well as the conditions
under which the person has been presented before him and
that the individual was informed of his rights. The duration
of the detention is also indicated in the official reports
presented for the signature of the person seized.
The above procedural requirements offer certain
guarantees to the individuals' rights. Moreover, the
Constitutional Council relying on Article Sixty-six of the
Constitution has held that the judiciary and administrative
authorities are competent to prevent abuses of the rules
previously described. This holding implies that an action
grounded on an unlawful identity check must be brought
before the courts. Furthermore, the provisions of Article
235 Id. In comparison, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution does not prevent a brief
detention of an individual on less than probable cause to get his
fingerprints where .the detention was authorized by a judge. See Hayes
v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
236 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 78-4 (Fr.).
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78-3 of the Code are imposed upon pain of nullity. However,
this sanction will be effective if all the subsequent
procedure is nullified and not only the official reports.
Nonetheless, some commentators wonder about the conformity
of this temporary seizure with the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights in its Article Five dealing
with arbitrary detentions. 237
II. Longer restraint on personal liberty
We will discuss the "arrest power" under American case-
law without getting into details. Then, we will focus on the
seizure of an individual up to twenty- four hours by the
French police.
A. "Arrest power"
1 . General power to arrest
American police have a general power to arrest on
probable cause (usually without a warrant) but no express
power to detain unarrestable person for interrogation. A
prolonged Terry stop becomes an arrest. Thus, probable cause
alone that a felony was committed by the person subject to
237 See Picard, supra note 37
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the arrest is sufficient to arrest the person. 238 On the
contrary, an arrest for a misdemeanor occurring out of the
officer's presence must be grounded on a warrant. 239 A
warrantless arrest implies that probable cause exists or is
determined promptly. Moreover, an extension of pretrial
detention requires judicial review of probable cause. 240
Arrest in dwellings require a warrant. 241 However,
statements of the arrestee made outside the premises are
admissible at trial when there is probable cause to arrest
him. 242
The police officer informs the person under arrest of
his intention as well as the cause of the arrest. Once a
suspect has been arrested, he must be taken "without
unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal
magistrate." 243 However, circumstances can allow a brief
delay between arrest and arraignment. A confession resulting
of an undue delay must be excluded under the McNabb-Mallory
rule. Those protections enforce the federal statutory prompt
238 See Watson v. United States, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
239 An arrest warrant is a legal instrument authorizing the
seizure of a person. It is indefinitely valid. The officer does not
need to have the warrant in his possession if he knows about it. See
Fed.R.Crim. P. 4.
240 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
241 See M innesota v. Olson, 110 S.Ct. 1684 (1990) (It held that
a warrant is necessary to arrest someone in his home even if there is
probable cause to arrest him. )
.
242 See Harris v. New York, 110 S.Ct. 1640 (1990).
243 See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). The
prompt presentation requirement was codified in Fed.R.Crim. P 5(a).
Under the case-law, voluntary confession obtained between six and 24
hours of the beginning of federal custody are admissible if Miranda
warnings were given. See also 18 U.S.C. 3501 (c) (The "Safe Harbor
Provision"
)
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presentation requirement. They do not apply to state
criminal trials. However, many states have adopted similar
provisions
.
Finally, under the Ker-Frisbie rule, 244 an unlawful
arrest is not a basis of dismissal of criminal charges.
2 . Search incident to arrest
The Court has held that a body search following a
permissible arrest is lawful, even though the arrestee was
not suspected to have incriminating evidence. 245 An search is
an incident to arrest 246 if "the formal arrest follow[s]
quickly on the heels" of the search and is sufficiently
justified by facts different from those uncovered by the
search. 247 The arrest with or without a warrant must be valid
and the search has to be on the spot of the arrest. In
meanwhile, courts have upheld delayed searches by relying
either on a police continuing right of search or on the
necessity to inventory the property found on the person
before ceiling her. 248 Nonetheless, an unreasonable intrusion
244 Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) (A U.S. citizen
forcibly removed from a foreign country for trial in Illinois state
court could not challenge his conviction on the ground he was
illegally brought there.); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (no
violation of due process when a state prisoner was kidnapped and
returned for trial)
.
245 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
246 See Ronald L. Carlson, Criminal Procedure Justice § 2.2.1
(4th ed. 1991) .
247 See united states v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
248 See Carlson, supra note 246.
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into the arrestee's body requires a search warrant. 249 Thus,
a surgical intrusion in the suspect's body was compelled by
the Court "even if likely to produce incriminating
evidence." 250 Some state courts have admitted the results of
blood sample taken on drivers even unconscious. 251 Moreover,
the failure to cooperate in an identification procedure,
e.g., refusal to give a blood sample, may be used as
evidence at trial against the accused. 252
Under the Payton rule, 253 an arrest warrant is
necessary for felony arrests within private residences
except exigent circumstances. Moreover, a warrantless search
of a place while the arrestee is in custody is not an
incident to arrest. Similarly, a warrant is required to
search an automobile which was first impounded and later
searched while the driver was under arrest.
3 . Pretextual arrest
249 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (The use of
stomach pumping to obtain morphine tablets which had been swallowed by
the suspect so "shock [ed] the conscience" of a "civilized society" as
to violate due process.). Nevertheless, a blood sample taken on an
arrestee does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (The defendant while under a lawful
arrest was forced to give a blood sample while resisting verbally. )
;
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1985) (A scraping of fingernail
producing incriminating evidence is a reasonable search.).
250 See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). However, a person
searched at the border (body invasion) does not have the same rights
as U.S. citizens. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S.
531 (1985) .
251 See State v. Findlay, 145 N.W.2d 650, 653 Iowa 1966).
252 See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) . See also
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (admitting the drunk
driver's answers showing his drunkenness as evidence.).
253 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) .
72
An individual may be arrested for minor offenses, e.g.,
traffic violations, to permit the police to search for
evidence related to more serious offenses as to which
probable cause is lacking. There are two different
approaches
.
First, the courts could determine whether a reasonable
officer "would have arrested the individual absent unrelated
suspicions." 254 They could also rely on an objective
standard: could the law officers validly have stopped or
arrested the suspect in the absence of the invalid
purpose? 255 The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted the objective
test which does not take into account the underlying
motivation of the law enforcers. 256
B. Detention up to 24 hours: the garde a vue
1. Initiative of the seizure
The French police officers have a powerful seizure
power called the Garde a vue. It emanated from practice
before being organized in the Criminal Procedure Code. This
police custody is decided by the judicial police officers
254 See united States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (CA 10
1988) .
255 Id.
256 See united States v. Scopo 19 F.3d 777 (1994).
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only with no need of judiciary authorities' approval. The
investigatory detention is available in the preliminary and
flagrancy inquiries 257 with noticeable differences. This
restriction of one's liberty is aimed to obtain confessions.
Therefore, one may fear police abuses (physical exhaustion,
threats or violence)
.
The prosecutor must be informed of the procedure in the
"best delays." The last 1993 version of the code did not
retain the notice of the prosecutor from the beginning of
the police custody. Some commentators have argued that this
"best delays" requirement was in conformity with the
philosophy of this temporary detention. 258 However, the
Constitutional Council specified that this notification must
occur as soon as possible to protect the suspect's rights.
The Cour de cassation held that police custody did not
violate Article 5.3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights requiring an immediate presentation of the person
seized before the judicial authorities. 259
2 . Length of the investigatory detention
257 See C. Pr. Pen. arts. 63, 77 (Fr.)
.
258 See 1993 J.C.P. Doctrine 3720 (Fr.). This article explains
that an immediate information of the prosecutor would contradict the
power of the police to initiate the proceedings. The magistrate's
control on police custody is a later one.
259 See Judgment of March 10, 1992, Cass. crim. , 1992 Bull.
Crim. , No. 105 (Fr. ) .
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In the flagrancy inquiry, a suspect as well as a
witness, or a "person capable to furnish information on the
facts or evidence seized" may be detained up to twenty- four
hours. 260 The time period starts when the individual is taken
in for questioning. A twenty-four hours prolongation
requested by police can be authorized by a written order of
the prosecutor except for witnesses' police custody. 261
However, in practice most prolongation are allowed by
telephone, the police custody's extension concerns only the
persons against whom there are presumptive grounds that they
have committed an offense. Moreover, the presentation of the
individuals before the prosecutor which did not exist before
19 93 is not mandatory. The urgency rationale of the
flagrancy inquiry may explains this rule.
Under a preliminary investigation, witnesses cannot be
subject to police custody. A prolongation of the police
custody must be based on the "necessities of the inquiry."
Then, the suspect must be taken before the prosecutor.
Nonetheless, under the new provisions of the Criminal
Procedure Code, "exceptional circumstances" (without saying
which) may permit a written authorization of prolongation
without presenting the suspect before the magistrate. The
recent reform did not change the situation of the witnesses
260 Police custody is available for flagrant crimes and delits
punished by imprisonment.
261 The detention of witnesses should not exceed 24 hours and
should only last the time necessary to interview them. See C. Pr . Pen.
art 63 (Fr. )
.
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heard under rogatories commissions. Thus, they may be
detained up to twenty- four hours. However, a twenty- four
hours' extension requires the taking of the witnesses before
the investigating judge. 262 This detention of an individuals
suspected of no crime is obviously excessive and violates
the European Convention on Human Rights in its Article Five.
For drug traffic and terrorism offenses, the detention
may last four days with the prolongation included (twenty-
four hours plus an extension of twenty- fours hours and a new
expansion of two days). 263
2. Guarantees against police's abuses
The law enforcers indicate in the proces verbaux
d' audition and in a special register the reasons of the
police custody, the times of the beginning and end of the
detention, and that the notice of the suspect's rights was
given. Similarly, the duration of the interrogations as well
as the resting periods are also mentioned in those official
reports signed by the suspect. His refusal to sign must be
indicated. 264
Nonetheless, the examining judge may exceptionally authorize
an extension of the police custody without seeing the witnesses. See
C. Pr. Pen. art 154 (Fr.).
263 See C. Pr. Pen. arts 706-29, 706-23 (Fr.).
264 See C. Pr. Pen. arts. 63-1, 64, 65 (Fr.).
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The suspect has a right to a medical exam to avoid
later motions to suppress coercive confessions. 265 The
physician is designated by the judicial police officer or
the prosecutor. The person retained has also a right to
contact certain persons. 266
An important debate took place in France as regards to
the right to counsel during police custody. The socialist
opposition challenged the bill which excluded any legal
assistance for drug traffic and terrorism offenses before
the Constitutional Council. It held that the right to
counsel is a defense right available at the inquiry stage.
Nevertheless, this right may be subject to different regimes
without violating the principle of equality before law among
citizens. The right to counsel attaches only after twenty
hours of detention or after thirty-six hours for certain
offenses. 267 The distinction drawn by the Constitutional
Council between the existence of the right for any offense
and its different modalities of exercise depending on the
offenses explains why this right does not exist immediately.
On one hand we the investigation stage and on the other hand
the instruction and trial stages where the defense rights
fully applied. Thus, the spirit of the French criminal
procedure would command this late legal assistance. 268
265 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 63-3 (Fr.)
266 See c _ Pr _ P£n _ art 63 _ 2 (Fr.)
267 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 63-4 (Fr.)
268 See supra note 258.
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The counsel can meet the person in garde a vue during
only thirty minutes and he has no access to police files.
The lawyer is nonetheless informed of the charges under
which the person is retained. In fact, his role is limited
to control the proceedings
.
3 . Sanction against arbitrary detentions
In theory, police abuses may be punished by fine and
imprisonment penalties. 269 In practice, these sanctions are
never used. Disciplinary punishments also exist as well as
civil penalties. Thus, in this latter case, the garde a vue
may be nullified only if the establishment of the truth has
been prevented because of an irregularity in the
proceedings. The judges will try to determine whether the
breach of law has had an important impact on the confession.
Thus, the gravity of the violation seems secondary if it did
not taint the confession.
269 See C. Pr. Pen. arts 432-4, 432-5 (Fr.)
CHAPTER IV: THE JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
I. Exclusion of evidence illegally searched and seized
The American exclusionary rule appears unique and does
not have a French equivalent. Therefore, the scholars point
out that American law provides suspects greater protection
than the French criminal procedure. However, the result
appears similar in both countries: the courts are reluctant
either to exclude improper incriminating evidence in the
United States or to nullify the procedure in France.
A. Right not to be tried on inadmissible evidence
1. Deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule
The exclusionary rule stated in Mapp v. Ohio, 270 bars
the use of evidence obtained pursuant to an illegal search
or seizure. The jury will not hear about the fruits of an
unreasonable search. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
Fourth Amendment and deterred the police from violating it.
Similarly, evidence deriving from incriminating items
illegally searched must be excluded under the "fruit of the
270 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
.
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poisonous tree" doctrine. 271 The problem raised by this rule
is the exclusion of evidence which is often necessary to
convict a criminal defendant. Then, it is argued that the
"guilty" person will go free.
The Fourth Amendment itself does not provide such a
sanction. It is a judicially created remedy. However, it is
argued that the exclusionary rule has a constitutional
origin and an effective deterrent purpose. 272 Some scholars
indicate that the exclusionary rule frees criminal suspects
in very few cases. 273 Therefore, this enforcement of the
Fourth Amendment does not hinder the efficiency of the
American criminal system. In the meantime, the restrictive
application of the exclusionary doctrine may explain its
limited impact on acquittals or dismissal of cases. There is
a much more powerful argument against the claim that the
rule frees criminals. The protection against arbitrary
intrusions commands that police respect the Constitution. 274
271 In comparison, the Cour de cassation quashed a conviction
resulting from an illegal seizure. An unfruitful investigation had
been closed. However, a police officer seized one of the suspect and
conducted a search. The suspect confessed his participation in a
criminal activity and was convicted. See Judgment of Jan. 22, 1953
(Isnard case), Cass. crim. , 1953 J.C.P. II 7456 rapport Brouchot
(Fr. ) .
272 See Malcom R. Wilkey & Stephen H. Sachs, Readings in the
Philosophy of Law, A debate on the Exclusionary rule, 261 (2nd ed.
1994) [hereinafter Wilkey & Sachs, A debate]. This latter author cites
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), to emphasize the
"constitutional necessity of effectively enforcing the Fourth
Amendment
.
273 Id. at 269.
274 Id.
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The guarantee of personal liberty may have a price, e.g., to
exclude vital evidence, in a free and democratic society.
There are repeated denunciations of the rule on
different grounds. The costs of the exclusionary rule have
been listed such as police perjury, excessive burden on the
courts through the motions to suppress evidence, and
performance by the judiciary of the executive branch's job
of disciplining law enforcers. 275 Today, there are proposals
before Congress revising the new Crime Bill to abolish the
exclusionary rule. 276
2. Nullity of the procedure
There is no so-called exclusionary rule in French law.
Evidence illegally obtained may still be included in the
case file. However, the finders of fact must have a "deep
seated conviction" (intime conviction) of guilt before
announcing their verdict. In other words, a conviction based
on illegal evidence will be annulled if the remaining
evidence leaves a real question of doubt on the defendant's
guilt
.
275 Id. at 263. Appellate judge Wilkey describes till 12 costs
of the exclusionary rule.
276 H.R. 666, 104th Cong., 1st Sess . (1995); H.R.Res. 61, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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The action taken by the authorities can be nullified if
the provisions of the law have been violated. 277 The issue of
nullification is raised during the pretrial hearing in the
indictment division (chambre d' accusation) for felonies and
during trial for misdemeanors. The striking of the tainted
part of a case does not cover the preliminary inquiry before
or instead of the judicial investigation. 278 The
investigating judge, the prosecutor, and since 1993 the
parties can bring an action to declare the searches and
seizures null before the chambre d' accusation219 but only
during the instruction. 280 The ordinance closing the
instruction purges definitively all the irregularities.
A relevant distinction exists between "textual
nullities" and "substantial nullities." The former are
pronounced when a particular provision of the Code enacts
the sanction (nullity) of its violation. In contrast, the
annulment of the proceedings is pronounced, even though this
sanction is not foreseen in a text, when infringements on
the defense rights occur (substantial nullities). Thus, a
substantial nullity is pronounced when the party's interest
have been seriously violated.
277 See judgment of June 24, 1960 (Soc. Frampar Le Monde case)
Conseil d'Etat, Long, Weil & Braibant, Grands Arrets de la
Jurisprudence Administrative (Fr.).
278 It is important to remember that suspect's rights fully
attach when the person is formally charged, at which time the formal
instruction begins.
279 The indictment division is also competent to pronounce
disciplinary sanctions (temporary suspension or decertification)
toward police officers' misconduct.
280 C. Pr. Pen. arts. 170-174 (Fr.).
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Under the Criminal Procedure Code, 281 the rules
regulating the perquisitions and the identity checks are
sanctioned through "textual nullities." Under a police
custody (garde a vue) , the notice to the detainee of his
rights, the medical exam, and the right to counsel are
substantial formalities. Those safeguards are a benefit to
the defense rights, and their violation requires the
annulment of the proceedings. On the contrary, the mere
formalities requirements such as the mentions in the
official reports about the detainee's notification of his
rights are not substantial. Therefore, the showing of the
accomplishment of those administrative formalities is
sufficient to prevent the invalidation of the proceedings.
Similarly, the provisions dealing with dwelling searches
during a flagrancy investigation are sanctioned by a
"textual nullity." 282
B. Focus on police efficiency
1. More flexibility to police
The scope of the exclusionary has been restricted and
the exceptions broadened. Thus, incriminating evidence from
an unlawful search will not be excluded when a police
281 See C. Pr. Pen. arts. 171, 802 (Fr
282 See C. Pr. Pen. art. 59 (Fr.).
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officer reasonably believes that his search warrant was
proper. This good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
was shaped in United States v. Leon. 283 Its justification
relies on a cost-benefit analysis: "The marginal or
nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence
obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a
subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the
substantial cost of exclusion." 284 The rationale of the
"reliance exception" is the absence of deterrence. An
officer acting in good faith will not be deterred by the
threat to exclude illegally obtained evidence. 285 It has been
argued that the good faith exception promotes "police
ignorance" of law. 286 The House has passed a bill extending
the good faith exception to warrantless searches. This
concept has been discussed in Senate. 287
The states are free to interpret their search and
seizure provisions. This construction may be broader than
the U.S. Supreme Court Fourth Amendment's interpretation. 288
Thus, some of them refuse to adopt a good faith exception to
the federal exclusionary rule. They hold that such an
283 468 U.S. 897 (1984) .
284 Id.
285
-phis exception was extended in Illinois v. Krull, 107 U.S.
1160 (1987), when an officer reasonably relied on a statute later
found to violate the Fourth Amendment. Notwithstanding, the Court
extended it in Arizona v. Evans, 115 S.Ct. 1185 (1995).
286 See Yale Kamisar, Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, Crim. L.
Bull. 15 (1979)
.
287 H.R. 666, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.Res. 61, 104th
Cong. , 1st Sess. (1995) .
288 See Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982).
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exception is incompatible with the guarantees of State
Constitution provisions against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 289 They rely on the deterrent effect of the
judicial remedy to exclude evidence as well as the
prohibition for the state to benefit from its error. 290
Derivative fruits of the violation such as plain view
or inevitable discovery can be introduced if they have an
independent source. 291 Moreover, the attenuation of the
causal link between the illegality and the fruits makes the
evidence admissible. 292 It is the so called purged taint
limitation rule. Similarly, admissions of guilt obtained
outside a dwelling despite an unlawful entry in one's home
are usable at trial. 293 Nevertheless, some states case-law
reject the U.S. Supreme Court approach. They consider that
289 See Gary v _ state, 422 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 1992); State v.
Guzman, State v. Evans, 866 P. 2d 869 (Ariz SupCt. 1994) (holding that
the exclusionary rule is properly made on the basis of an erroneous
computer record); 122 IDAHO 981 (1992); State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d
553 (NC SupCt. 1998)
.
290 The Supreme Court of Idaho has held: "As the state is only
deprived of what it was not entitled to possess in the first place, to
say the Fourth Amendment exacts a cost to the state is like saying
that a thief pays for committing a theft when he is required to return
what he stole .
"
291 United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471-74 (1980).
292 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,491 (1963). The
Supreme Court deemed that the defendant's voluntary confession
attenuated the connection between his illegal arrest and the
subsequently statement.
293 See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990). The Court held
"where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the
exclusionary rule does not bar the State's use of a statement made by
the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken
after an arrest made in the home in violation of Payton."
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the "per se rule in Harris" affords insufficient protection
to citizens' privacy rights under states' constitution. 294
Illegally seized evidence (obtained in violation of
Miranda warnings) can be used to impeach the defendant's
trial testimony. 295 The U.S. Supreme Court extended the
impeachment exception from impeachment of direct testimony296
to impeachment of cross-examination testimony. 297 However,
the Court specified the impeachment exception remains
limited to the defendant's own testimony. 298 Finally,
illegally obtained evidence may be produced to obtain a
Grand Jury indictment. 299 The formal rules of evidence do not
apply during the Grand Jury proceedings
.
2 . Reluctance of the French courts to exclude illegal
evidence
In the Trignol case previously cited, 300 the French
police officers investigating a kidnapping stopped many
vehicles to search them. Mr. Trignol refused to open his
294 See State v. Geisler, 25 CONN. 672, 610 A. 2d 1225 (1992).
The State court held that the Harris rule "does not grant to
Connecticut citizens the scope of exclusion that we believe is
necessary to deter police from entering a home without a warrant."
295 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
296 See Walder v. United states, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) .
297 See united States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
298 See James v . Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648 (1990). An Illinois
statute extending the exception to all defense witnesses was held
unconstitutional
.
299 See United states v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
300 See Judgment of Nov. 8, 1979, Cass. crim. , 1979 J.C.P. II
19337 (Fr.). See supra p53-54.
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trunk, and was arrested. Before court, he claimed that the
search was unconstitutional relying on the decision of
January 12, 1977 of the Constitutional Council. 301 However,
the Cour de cassation refused to admit the binding effect of
the Constitutional Council's decision. The Cour de cassation
implicitly upheld the Tribunal correctionnel reasoning. The
Constitutional Council only invalidated general and random
searches where the police were not investigating a
particular offense. According to the Court, the law
enforcers were searching vehicles within a flagrancy
inquiry. 302 Therefore, the Constitutional Council's decision
was held not applicable and Mr. Trignol was convicted of
refusing to submit to a vehicle search.
The Cour de cassation is reluctant to conclude that the
non respect of a particular formality has prejudiced the
rights of defense (substantial nullity). Thus, the detention
of a suspect during two more days after the legal period of
the police custody {garde a vue) was not held fundamentally
prejudicial to the suspect. A prejudice in a statutory
violation when the person's right to defend himself against
charges has not yet attached will not be found easily. 303
301 See supra note 185.
302 In this case, the concept of flagrancy was broaden to a non
suspicious situation (the vehicles were automatically stopped) and to
a search taking place several days after the kidnapping.
303 See Judgment of Oct. 21, 1980, Cass. crim. , 1980 D.Jur. 104
(Fr. ) .
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II. Protections against police abuses
A. Alternative remedies to the exclusionary rule
The exclusionary rule is the subject of an important
debate in the United States. It is sometime argued that the
absence of such a rule in other civilized countries
demonstrates the irrationality of the remedy.
For some scholars, it is not a "constitutional
necessity but a method to enforce the Fourth Amendment." 304
Therefore, other remedies may guarantee the individuals'
rights as well. Thus, the constitutional protection could be
enforced through civil tort action. 305 According to the
general view, a victim of an unlawful detention must prove
both a confinement against his will and an illegal one to
recover for false imprisonment. The citizens victims of
illegal searches may also sue the law authorities under the
doctrine of respondent superior. 306 The tort remedy should
not substitute the exclusionary rule but enhance it through
compensation of innocent victims of government misconduct. 307
Other views suggest the efficiency of disciplinary
sanctions, mini-trial of the overzealous officer separate
304 See wilkey & Sachs, A debate supra note 272, at 2 62.
305 See Carlson, supra note 133 at §§ 10.15 (2), 10.18.
306 See Herman v. state, 357 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1974). A couple
recovered damages ($14,000) for an early morning "no-knock" search in
the wrong place.
307 See Wilkey & Sachs, A debate, supra note 272, at 272.
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from the main criminal trial or decertification of police
officers to enforce the Fourth Amendment guarantees. 308
B. Role of the French Constitutional Council
Since 1971, the movement of "constitutionalization" of
criminal law offers better protection against government
arbitrary interferences. The Constitutional Council relies
on Article Sixty-six of the Constitution to require a prompt
control of the judicial authority when encroachments on
individual liberties are authorized under a statute. The
intervention of the judiciary seems to be a prerequisite to
valid a bill under the constitutional check.
In 1983 a bill authorizing agents of the tax
administration to search and seize without any judicial
supervision was challenged before the Constitutional
Council. The Constitutional Council balanced the need to
control fiscal fraud against the principle of inviolability
of the domicile. It held the bill unconstitutional because
the judicial authority did not intervene in the
proceedings. 309 Thus, the detection of fraud must comply with
308 See Goldman and Puro, Decertification of Police: An
Alternative to Traditional Remedies for Police Misconduct , 15 Hastings
Const. L. Q. 45 (1987) .
309 See Decision of Dec, 29, 1983, Cons, const. (Fr.). The
decision referred to different constitutional principles encompassed
in the "bloc de constitutionnalite" : Article 13 of the Declaration of
the Rights of Man providing equal contributions from all the citizens
and the right of privacy consecrated by the decision of January 12,
1977.
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the principle of individual freedom also protected by the
Constitution. The Constitutional Council has maintained its
position in its following decisions. 310
The constitutional norms as construed by the
Constitutional Council have been followed by the Cour de
Cassation, particularly in the Bogdane and Vuckovic cases,
the Court overruled its own case-law. The issue concerned
the distinction between administrative and judicial police,
and the challenge of administrative identity checks before
the judicial courts. 311 The Avocat General (Attorney-General
who insures a proper application and a uniform
interpretation of the law) relied upon the Constitutional
Council's holdings to emphasize the duty of the judicial
authority to protect individual liberty wherever it is
threatened. The Constitutional Council had consacred the
jurisdiction of the judicial courts although the traditional
administrative tribunals' competence to control the
operations of administrative police. Thus, since 1985 it is
310 See Decision of Jan. 19, 1988, Con. const., Fr . (The search
and seizure powers given to the agents of the "Commissions des
Operations Boursieres" without any judicial control were held
unconstitutional); Decision of Dec. 27, 1990, Con. const., Fr . (same
holding in this decision related to the agents of the communication
agency); Decision of Jan. 12, 1977, Con. const., Fr
.
, 1978 D. Jur . 173
(unconstitutionality of a law giving the police unrestricted authority
in vehicle searches); Decision of Jan. 18, 1995, Con. const., Fr
.
,
supra note 59
.
311 Under Article 66 of the Constitution, the judicial authority
is guardian of individual liberty. Article 136 of the Criminal
Procedure Code states that "in all cases of threats to individual
liberty, the conflict [of competencies] can never be raised by the
administrative authority, and the judicial courts always have
exclusive jurisdiction."
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said that the Constitutional Council has become the highest
court of the land.
C. European safeguards
The enforcement of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of
November 4, 1950, provides an efficient protection against
government's abuses. 312 It obliges the contracting states to
modify their legislation in conformity with this treaty.
Thus, the European Court of Human Rights in 1993 held
that the provisions of the French Customs Code (articles 64
and 454) 313 violated Article Eight of the Convention. 314 The
Court examined the scope of the interference, the accordance
of the proceedings with the law, their legitimate aim, and
their proportionality. 315
In those three cases, a numerous number of documents
were seized (till 15,000) among which some were not relevant
to the police inquiry. The searches took place in private
firms and homes. The Court recognized an interference with
312 See supra note 60.
313 Article 454 allowed customs agents to establish offenses
against the regulations governing financial dealings with foreign
countries through house searches in any place. Article 64 authorized
customs officers to carry out house searches if accompanied by a local
police officer or a judicial police officer during daytime. There were
exceptions to the presence of a police officer while a premises search
was conducted. Those articles are not overridden by the Criminal
Procedure Code
.
314 Affaires Cremieux v. France,; Aff. Funke v. France; Aff.
Miailhe v. France, Eur. Ct . H.R. (ser. A) at 256 (1993).
315 See Art Eight, supra p22.
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the applicants' private life and their correspondence. The
petitioners claimed the unconstitutionality of the customs
code provision because houses searches and seizures were not
subject to judicial authorization. 316 However, the Court held
that Article Eight of the Convention contained no
requirement that dwellings search should be judicially-
authorized in advance. Moreover, it was unnecessary for the
Court to rule on this issue because the interferences were
found incompatible with Article Eight.
The Court also admitted the legitimate aim of the
interferences with the interest of "the economic well-being
of the country and the prevention of crime." The
jurisprudence of the Court has always upheld that "the
contracting states have a certain margin of appreciation in
assessing the need for an interference." Nonetheless, the
exceptions provided in Article Eight must be construed
narrowly. In these cases, the court recognized the
difficulties encountered by the states to prevent flight of
capital and tax evasion. Nevertheless, the legislation under
examination did not provide "adequate and effective
safeguards against abuses." The exclusive competence of the
customs authorities to assess the expediency, number,
length, and the scale of inspections as well as the absence
of any judicial warrant requirement were disproportionate
316 The law enacted the Customs Code was not challenged before
the Constitutional Council. Therefore, the regular courts cannot pass
upon the constitutionality of articles 454 and 64.
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with the legitimate purpose of the searches and seizures.
The French government was convicted to pay damages, at least
in one case. In the two other ones, the Court held that the
judgment afforded the parties sufficient compensation for
it. The impact of the French government's conviction on the
individual rights' protections should not be neglected
despite the absence of monetary compensation.
The Customs Code provisions on search and seizure have
been modified in 1986 and in 1989 to afford greater
guarantees against arbitrary powers. From now on, a
domiciliary search must be authorized by the President of
the Tribunal de Grande Instance except in a flagrancy case.
Moreover, the searches are limited to certain offenses. The
searches in a home also require the presence of the occupant
or a representing person or at least two witnesses.
Nonetheless, some scholars have argued that those provisions
could be once again challenged before the European
institutions, and the French government could be
convicted. 317
317 See Dominique Viriot-Barrial , La Preuve en Droit Douanier et
la Convention Europeenne des Droits de L'Homme, Rev. sc . crim. 537
(1994) (Fr. )
.
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III. Conclusion
Striking the proper balance between law enforcement and
individual liberties poses a challenge to any society, and
seems difficult to find. In American case and statutory law,
the issue of probable cause for a search or seizure is the
touchstone of the reasonableness standard under the Fourth
Amendment. The numerous exceptions including consent
searches, exigent circumstances, automobile searches,
investigatory stops, and others have reduced constitutional
protections on liberties. The exclusionary rule does not
apply when the police did not intend to violate the
suspect's rights or act under circumstances where their
ignorance of law is excusable.
French police, when acting in a flagrancy inquiry, may
conduct forcible searches and seizures. They may also hold a
person in custody for up to twenty- fours hours when
detention is necessary for purposes of the inquiry. The non-
coercive preliminary inquiry also gives large powers to the
law enforcers. Police custody may be an element of this. In
both sorts of inquiries, the search of a dwelling requires
the consent of the household. The privacy of one's premises
appears more protected than freedom of movement. Finally, in
a judicial investigation, e.g., once an instruction has been
opened, the rogatories commissions are usually general
concerning the investigative powers delegated to the
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judicial police officer by the juge d' instruction.
Nonetheless, the police investigation must comply with the
Criminal Procedure Code provisions (such as keeping a
complete record of police action). The defendant's rights
are more protected during a judicial investigation, and
during the trial itself where the rights of defense fully
attach. Even though the indictment division may nullify the
prior proceeding and may return the case to another
investigation, it rarely happens. Then, illegally seized
evidence may be produced at trial
.
Foreign criminal procedure doctrines are sometimes
pointed out to American authorities to argue in favor of
legal changes. Comparative study is then used as a tool of
law revision. Thus, the absence of exclusionary rule in
other nations, and the general warrant requirement in France
permit some American scholars to denounce the effects of
their own legal rules. We also find the same attitude among
certain French authors
.
In American criminal procedure, states have recently
reacted against narrow construction of federal
Constitutional guarantees by the U.S. Supreme Court. This
reaction has been called "the New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure." Many states go beyond the Supreme Court's
analysis of the Fourth Amendment to grant broader rights to
their citizens. State courts' judgments resting on adequate
and independent state grounds cannot be reviewed. Thus, the
95
"Federal Constitution gives a minimum level of protection
(the floor) and the states provide larger safeguards (the
ceiling) against government interference." 318
French political authorities following the general
demand have enlarged law enforcers' powers. The legislature
also intervenes to legalize factual police practices such as
identity checks. The regular judges can never pass upon the
constitutionality of statutes, yet they must apply them. For
this reason, the role of the Constitutional Council has
evolved and expanded. From a supervision of the separation
of powers between the Executive and the Legislature, it has
become a guardian of individual liberty. The access of the
individuals to constitutional justice remains an ongoing
debate
.
An ethical Europe has started to exist through the
enforcement of the Convention of Human Rights. The power of
the contracting states to settle their criminal policy must
comply with the European standards. The nation states may be
compelled to revise their criminal procedure rules. Thus,
France enacted a law in 1991 on wiretapping after having
being convicted by the Court of Human Rights in 1990.
Today, in France as well as in the United States,
conservative political and judicial authorities aim to
318 Lecture, Professor Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., University of
Georgia School of Law, Criminal Procedure I, October 3, 1994.
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expand the role of law enforcement. Nevertheless, safeguards
do exist and are applied through procedural requirements.
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